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ABSTRACT

This dissertation consists of three studies exploring nonprofessional investors’
decision making. Technological advancements witnessed by the capital markets in recent
years have caused significant changes to the dissemination and use of information,
particularly by nonprofessional investors. Among these developments is the growth of
social media that allows anyone to post information upon which others may rely and the
availability of DAs that assist decision makers in evaluating the quality of information
reported by an organization. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the benefits
of using DAs that are capable assessing the quality of information reported to capital
market participants and to investigate the effect of information retrieved from social
media on nonprofessional investors’ decisions.
Study 1 highlights concerns over the ease of spreading video disclosures via
social media outlets. Recent evidence from practice and research suggests that the trend
of issuing video disclosures is growing and that investors are exposed to the risk of
including deceptive information contained in those videos in their decision making
process. The theoretical model introduced in this study suggests that investors can use
deception detection DAs to identify deceptive behavior in video disclosures, and that the
use of such DAs affects their perceptions of disclosure credibility. This study posits that
management’s pre-existing reputation affects investors’ perceptions of disclosure
credibility, and that the negative output of a deception detection DA can dilute the effect
of management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’ perceptions of disclosure
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credibility. Using data from 376 nonprofessional investors, the findings support the
proposed theoretical model and suggest that deception detection dilutes the effect of
management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility.
The effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility is significantly weaker when the output of deception detection DA
detects deception than when it fails to detect deception. Supplemental analyses suggest
that the effect of deception detection is not limited to investors’ perceptions of disclosure
credibility, but also affects investors’ willingness to invest. Deception detection dilutes
the effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on willingness to invest as well. These
findings suggest that investors can mitigate the risks associated with video disclosures
and improve their decisions by using deception detection DAs.
Study 2 highlights concerns over the spread of linguistic manipulations in
corporate disclosures. Recent evidence from the accounting literature suggests that
managers strategically use linguistic manipulations and that investors unintentionally
include the effect of these linguistic manipulations in their decisions. This study builds on
the existing literature on linguistic manipulations and argues that providing investors with
a DA that is capable of detecting linguistic manipulations can assist them in making
investment decisions. The theoretical model introduced Study 2 suggests that the
detection of linguistic manipulations (the occurrence of an expectation violation)
moderates the effect of managers’ incentives on investors’ willingness to invest through
disclosure credibility such that the effect of managers’ incentive on investors’ willingness
to invest is expected to be weaker when the DA detects linguistic manipulations than
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when the DA fails to detect linguistic manipulations. Using data from 472
nonprofessional investors, the findings do not support the proposed theoretical model and
suggest the effect of management incentive on investors’ willingness to invest through
disclosure credibility is not moderated by the detection of linguistic manipulations. These
findings show that detecting linguistic manipulation has the same effect on managers
with incentive to manipulate the language used corporate reports as those with no
incentive to manipulate the language used in corporate reports.
Study 3 highlights concerns over social media outlets that have enabled investors
to communicate between themselves at an unprecedented rate. This study highlights the
risk of using information retrieved from social media outlets and argues that investors are
exposed to the risk of including erroneous information in their information set. This study
uses the “Social Identification of the De-individuation Effect” model (SIDE) to argue that
visual anonymity has an effect on investors’ willingness to invest through their
perceptions of disclosure credibility and that this effect depends on whether investors’
have low or high social identification with the group of forum users. Using data from 401
nonprofessional investors, the findings do not support the proposed theoretical model.
Nevertheless, findings from this study suggest that investors’ social identification has an
effect on their perceptions of disclosure credibility, and that social identification and
visual anonymity have a joint effect on investors’ willingness to invest. More precisely,
investors with low social identification are more influenced by forum comments when
they read the forum comments via text than when they view the forum comments via
video; and, investors with high social identification are more influenced by forum
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comments when they view the forum comments than when they read the forum
comments. While findings from this study provide support for the moderating role of
social identification advanced in SIDE, the moderating role of social identification is in
the opposite direction. Thus, this study fails to provide support for SIDE.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This dissertation responds to Mercer’s (2004) call for more research on investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility by investigating the effect of certain factors on
nonprofessional investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility. In her study, Mercer
highlighted the importance of disclosure credibility and identified four factors that can
have an impact on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility. Mercer argued that
unless credible, management disclosure is not included in investors’ decision making.
She defines disclosure credibility as “…investors’ perceptions of the believability of a
particular disclosure” (p.186). She highlights that investors’ perceptions of disclosure
credibility is different and independent from the objective credibility of disclosure. In
other words, disclosure that is objectively credible can be perceived as non-credible
disclosure and vice-versa. The fact that disclosure credibility is a perception and not an
objective measure creates several concerns. For example, managers can use certain
techniques to orient investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility toward a certain
direction and these techniques can lead investors to making poor investment decisions.
While Mercer (2004) limits her definition of disclosure credibility to
“believability”, this dissertation adapts a measure of disclosure credibility from the
message credibility literature (Chesney and Su, 2010; Flanagin and Metzger, 2007, 2003,
2000). In this literature, believability constitutes only one of five criteria of credible
information. The operationalization of disclosure credibility in this dissertation uses all of
the factors identified by the message credibility literature. More precisely, management
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disclosure is credible if it is believable, accurate, trustworthy, unbiased, and complete
(Chesney and Su, 2010; Flanagin and Metzger, 2007, 2003, 2000).
This dissertation also concentrates on a specific category of investors,
nonprofessional investors. The literature uses different terminologies for this specific
group of investors such as less sophisticated investors (e.g., Rennekamp, 2012),
individual investors (e.g., Farkas and Murthy, 2014), retail investors (e.g., Cohen et al.,
2011), small investors (e.g., Miller, 2010), less experienced investors (e.g., Hodge and
Pronk, 2006), or investors (e.g., Pinsker, 2007). All of these terminologies are used to
describe investors who do not have the expertise and training of professional investors.
Nonprofessional investors are a significant constituent of capital markets and, relatively
to professional investors, are at a disadvantage. Evidence from the literature suggests that
nonprofessional investors lack the necessary knowledge and expertise to analyze
financial statement (Maines and McDaniel, 2000; Frederickson and Miller, 2004; Pitre,
2012), focus on explicitly stated rather than implicitly stated information (Frederickson
and Miller, 2004; Krische, 2005; Han and Tan, 2007), prefer to use qualitative
information over quantitative information (Hofstedt, 1972; Lee and Tweeedie, 1975;
Rowbotton and Lymer, 2009; Arnold et al., 2010), employ a directive search strategy
(Hodge et al., 2004; Arnold et al., 2012), suffer from an earning fixation problem
(Hewitt, 2009), react unintentionally to certain stimulus (Fredrickson and Miller, 2004;
Krische, 2005; Rennekamp, 2012; Elliott, 2006), and make conservative investment
decisions (Sharma, 2006).
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Nonprofessional investors’ behavioral characteristics expose them to a high risk
of misinterpreting information released in capital markets. Their misinterpretation of
information could have an impact on their actual investment decisions or on factors
affecting their investment decisions such as disclosure credibility. This dissertation
attempts to investigate the behavioral implication of introducing a DA and
recommendations from social media on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility.

Study 1
The Moderating Effect of Deception Detection on Nonprofessional Investors’
Perceptions of Management Credibility and Disclosure Credibility
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of introducing the output of a
deception detection DA into nonprofessional investors’ decision making model. Major
corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom consist of evidence that deception is not
uncommon in the business arena. Investors were intentionally mislead and manipulated to
make poor investment decisions. Investors’ failure to detect deception at an early stage is
due to the difficulty and complexity of detecting deception. Unless they receive deception
detection training, investors are unlikely to detect deception. While there are several
disclosure outlets that can include deception, the first study of this dissertation focuses on
deception in video disclosures.
Technological advancements have eased the process of creating videos and
disseminating them to a large audience. Evidence from practice suggests that CEOs take
advantage of these technological changes and use this technology to communicate
information to capital market participants. Since investors are not necessarily capable of
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detecting deception from this type of disclosure, their investment decisions become
dependent on the accuracy of these disclosures.
Investors use several clues to build perceptions about disclosure credibility.
Among these clues is management pre-existing reputation; disclosure from managers
with good pre-existing reputation is deemed to be more credible than disclosure from
managers with lower pre-existing reputation. However, managers’ pre-existing reputation
can be misleading. Investors have limited access to information and managers can
establish a good pre-existing reputation by obfuscating negative information that may
create a bad pre-existing reputation. As a result, investors may include deceptive
information in their information set. On the other hand, investors may mistakenly exclude
valuable information from their information set when managers have a bad pre-existing
reputation. In either case, investors may build inaccurate perceptions of disclosure
credibility. The theoretical framework advanced in this study suggests that providing
participants with the output of a deception detection DA may help investors to
appropriately assess disclosure credibility. More precisely, this study suggests that the
effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’ perceptions of disclosure
credibility depends on whether the DA detects deception.
Expectation Violation Theory (EVT) is used to predict the effect of
management’s pre-existing reputation and detecting deception on investors’ perceptions
of disclosure credibility. The theoretical model advanced in this study suggests
management’s pre-existing reputation affects investors’ perceptions of disclosure
credibility such that managers with good pre-existing reputation are perceived to be more
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credible than managers with bad pre-existing reputation. Based on Mercer (2004),
management credibility is also theorized to mediate the effect of management’s preexisting reputation on disclosure credibility. In other words, the effect of management’s
pre-existing reputation on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility flows through
management credibility.
Deception detection is also theorized to moderate the effect of management’s preexisting reputation on investors’ perceptions of management credibility such that the
effect of management pre-existing reputation on management credibility is conditional on
whether the DA detects deception. More precisely, the theoretical model advanced in this
study argues that management pre-existing reputation has a stronger effect on
management credibility when the DA fails to detect deception than when the DA detects
deception. Since management credibility mediates the effect of management pre-existing
reputation on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility, this effect is theorized to be
conditional on whether the DA detects deception as well such that the effect of
management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’ perceptions of management
credibility is also conditional on whether the DA detects deception. In other words, the
theoretical argument made in study suggests that the indirect effect of management preexisting reputation is stronger when the DA fails to detect deception than when the DA
detects deception.
The theoretical model was tested using a 2X2 factorial design with management’s
preexisting reputation (bad vs. good) and deception detection (deception detected vs.
deception not detected) as the independent variables. Management’s pre-existing
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reputation was manipulated by providing participants with a business journal article that
described the CEO favorably in the good pre-existing reputation condition and
unfavorably in the bad pre-existing reputation condition. Deception detection was
manipulated by providing participants with the output of a deception detection DA. In the
deception detected condition, participants were told that there is 90% likelihood that the
CEO is being deceptive; in the deception not detected condition, participants were told
that there is a 10% likelihood that the CEO is being deceptive. A total of 376 useable
responses were collected from nonprofessional investors to test the hypotheses.
Findings from this study provide support for EVT and suggest that deception
detection dilutes the effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility such that the direct and indirect effect of
management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility
are weaker when the output from the DA detects deception than when it fails to detect
deception.

Study 2
Getting Caught “Sugar Coating”: The Behavioral Implications of Detecting Linguistic
Manipulations on Nonprofessional Investors’ Decisions
Recent findings from studies on narratives within corporate reports indicate that
managers are strategically changing the language in these narratives to “sugar coat” the
information they are communicating to investors. For example, Cho et al. (2010) reported
that the tone used in the MD&A section of annual report depends on the company’s
environmental performance. Another stream of research investigates whether changes in
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the language used in the narratives within corporate reports impact investors’ judgments.
Findings from this stream of research suggest that changes in language within corporate
reports are significantly associated with changes in investors’ judgment and decision
making (Henry, 2008; Feldman et al., 2010; Hales et al., 2011; Rennekamp, 2012; Miller,
2010; Riley et al., 2014). Combining findings from these two streams of research indicate
that managers are using corporate narratives to manipulate investors and that this strategy
is effectively impacting investors’ decision making. Therefore, investors are exposed to
the risk of making poor investment decision. Several studies have created discrimination
models that are capable of discriminating between narratives that include language
manipulations from narratives that are free from language manipulations. The purpose of
this study is to investigate whether providing investors with the output of a DA that is
capable of discriminating between narratives with language manipulations and narratives
with no language manipulations impacts investors’ decision making.
Similar to Study 1, EVT is used to explore the effect of introducing the output of
a DA that is capable of detecting linguistic manipulations into nonprofessional investors’
decision making. The theoretical model advanced in this study suggests that managerial
reporting incentives have an effect on investors’ willingness to invest through their
perceptions of disclosure credibility and that this effect depends on whether the output of
the DA detects linguistic manipulations. More precisely, managerial incentives have a
weaker effect on investors’ willingness to invest when the DA detects linguistic
manipulation than when the DA fails to detect linguistic manipulations.
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The theoretical model was examined using a 2X2 factorial design with managers’
incentives (incentive vs. no incentive) and the output of the DA (linguistic manipulation
detected vs. linguistic manipulation not detected) as the independent variables. Managers’
incentive was manipulated by providing participants with a business journal article that
described the company as a bad environmental performer in the incentive condition and
described the company as a good environmental performer in the no incentive condition.
The result of the DA was manipulated by providing participants with the output of the
DA analysis. In the detected linguistic manipulation condition, participants were told that
the analyzed narrative is not free from tone manipulations; in the linguistic manipulation
not detected condition, participants were told that the analyzed narrative is free from tone
manipulations. Useable responses from 472 nonprofessional investors were used to test
the hypotheses.
The results from testing the theoretical model indicate that investors’ perceptions
of disclosure credibility mediates the relationship between managerial incentives and
investors’ willingness to invest and that detecting linguistic manipulations in narratives
does not moderate this relationship. The results show that detecting linguistic
manipulation impacts investors’ decisions regardless of whether managers have incentive
to manipulate the information in corporate reports. These results suggest that these DAs
can impact investors’ decisions and that this effect is not sensitive to managerial
incentives.
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Study 3
The Impact of Social Media on Nonprofessional Investors’ Decision Making
Because of the significant growth of technology, information can spread via the
internet at an unprecedented rate. Changes to the communication process between
individuals create new challenges for the capital market. While technology has facilitated
access to information and enhanced the communication flow between participants of
capital markets, it may also enhance the spread of rumors and misleading information.
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether information from social media has an
influence on investors’ decision making and how this information influences their
decision making.
This study uses the “Social Identification of the De-individuation Effect” model
(SIDE) to investigate the effect of information retrieved from social media on investors’
judgment and decision making. More precisely, this study investigates the effect of
comments in unregulated forums on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and
their willingness to invest. The theoretical model advanced in this study suggests that
visual anonymity in social media has an impact in investors’ willingness to invest
through their perceptions of disclosure credibility, and that this effect depends on the
extent of their social identification with members of the forum.
The theoretical model was tested using a 2X2 factorial design with visual
anonymity (text comments vs. video comments) and social identification (low social
identification vs. high social identification) as the independent variables. Visual
anonymity was manipulated by providing participants with text comments vs. video
comments. Social identification was manipulated through membership in an investment
9

forum. In the high social identification condition, participants were told that they were
active members of the forum. In the low social identification condition, participants were
told that they were not members of the forum. Useable responses from 401
nonprofessional investors were used to test the hypotheses.
Results from testing the theoretical model suggest that social identification has an
effect on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility, and that social identification and
visual anonymity have a joint effect on investors’ willingness to invest. The results fail to
provide support for SIDE and suggest that individuals with low social identification were
more influenced by the group norm when they read text comments from the forum than
when they viewed video comments, and that individuals with high social identification
with a forum group were more influenced by the group norm when they viewed video
comments than when they read text comments.
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STUDY 1
THE MODERATING EFFECT OF DECEPTION DETECTION ON
INVESTORS’ PERCEPTIONS OF MANAGEMENT CREDIBILITY
AND DISCLOSURE CREDIBILITY
Introduction
Major accounting collapses such as Enron and WorldCom have shown that
managers do not always act in the best interest of investors and are subject to engaging in
deceptive behavior. On multiple occasions, CEOs have deceived their audience and have
communicated erroneous information to capital market participants (e.g., Beasley et al.,
2010). The rapid expansion of social media and related technological advances has
created new disclosure channels that companies may use to communicate information to
investors. Most of the information disseminated through these new disclosure channels is
not subject to audit or other forms of assurance. Video disclosures are one type of these
new disclosure channels. Evidence from practice suggests that CEOs currently use video
disclosures for several purposes such as apologizing (Seward, 2011) , reading
shareholder’s letters (Jones, 2011), building investors’ confidence (Smith, 2013),
promoting a new product (Swallow, 2010), explaining merger decisions (Rayburn, 2009),
announcing earnings (Feintzeig and Silverman, 2013), responding to investors’ questions
in Question & Answer (Q&A) sessions, and announcing earnings’ restatement (Elliott et
al. 2012). Despite the fact that these videos allow investors to access more information,
they may include less than accurate information and may be used by management to
deceive investors.
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Deception in corporate disclosures is problematic as investors rely on those
disclosures to make investment decisions. Unless they are able to detect deceptive
information, investors risk making bad investment decisions. Investors may be able to
detect deceptive behavior if they can identify behavioral cues that are associated with
deceptive behavior. Investors can examine some of these clues to assess whether the
information reported to them is free from deception. Nevertheless, some clues are not
necessarily associated with deceptive behavior. For example, when investors use
management reputation to determine the credibility of information communicated to them
(Mercer, 2004), they may believe that managers who have built a good reputation are less
likely to include deceptive information in their communications. However, reputation is
not a reliable mechanism for deciding whether management is being forthcoming in their
disclosures. Managers can build a good reputation by providing information to investors
that may contain deceptive information. For example, Enron management built their good
reputation while consistently deceiving the public (McLean and Elkind, 2003). Their
reputation was not diminished or doubted until their deceptive behaviors were
discovered. Alternatively, managers with bad pre-existing reputation may be perceived to
be deceptive when they are telling the truth. A negative management reputation, by
itself, does not necessarily increase investors’ likelihood of detecting deceptive
information.
The likelihood of an investor detecting deception is very low. Without training or
assistance, an individual’s ability to detect deception is no better than chance (Jensen et
al., 2005; Jensen et al., 2010; Jensen et al., 2011). According to the Wall Street Journal
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(2010), some professional analysts are receiving training in deception detection
techniques, some institutional investors are hiring deception detection experts, and Wall
Street firms are hiring deception detection consultants to analyze individuals. “…
[I]nvestors are turning to behavioral specialists, looking to find things in faces and
phrases that may not be revealed in financial statements” (Stock, 2009). Nonprofessional
investors on the other hand may not have the resources that professional investors have to
train themselves. While training on deception detection may not be an option for most
nonprofessional investors, a DA that detects deceptive behavior may be a solution to help
investors evaluate the truthfulness of disclosures.
There are several DAs that have been developed to help individuals detect
deception in videos. For example, the “Behavioral Analysis Prototype” (BAP) is a DA
that is capable of analyzing linguistic and kinetic cues from video recordings and
reporting whether there are signs of deception (Jensen et al., 2010). Similarly, a
deception detection DA has been tested and used by customs officials to detect lies at the
U.S. boarders (Biscobing and Gilger, 2013). Such a DA may be useful to investors by
allowing them to detect deception in video disclosures. To be beneficial, these DAs have
to have an effect on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and management
credibility. The availability of the DA does not necessarily mean that investors will
include its recommendation in their decision making. Investors have access to many other
competing resources such as analysts’ forecast, management reputation, social media, etc.
As a result, investors’ may not always benefit from a deception detection DA. The
purpose of this study is to investigate whether investors can benefit from the use of the
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output from a deception detection DA. More precisely, this study aims to explore the
effect of the output of a deception detection DA on investors’ perceptions of management
credibility and disclosure credibility.
Burgoon and Hale (1988) and Burgoon (1993)’s Expectation Violation Theory
(EVT), and research on reputation and disclosure credibility are used to predict the
behavioral consequences of investors using deception detection DAs. The theoretical
framework of this study suggests that management’s pre-existing reputation affects
investors’ perceptions of management credibility and disclosure credibility, and that the
effect of management’s pre-existing reputation is conditional on whether the deception
detection DA detects deception. More precisely, management’s pre-existing reputation
should have a weaker (stronger) effect on investors’ perceptions of management
credibility and disclosure credibility when the deception detection DA detects (fails to
detect) deception. Moreover, management credibility is predicted to affect disclosure
credibility. Therefore, the effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility is predicted to flow through management credibility,
and this effect is also conditional on whether the DA detects deception such that
deception detection will dilute the effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on
disclosure credibility.
In order to test this model, 376 usable responses were collected from
nonprofessional investors. The results provide support for the theoretical model and
suggest that deception detection dilutes the effect of management’s pre-existing
reputation on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility. The effect of management’s
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pre-existing reputation on investors’ perceptions of management credibility and
disclosure credibility is significantly weaker when the deception detection DA detects
deception than when the deception detection DA fails to detect deception. Findings from
supplemental analyses suggest that deception detection also influences investors’
willingness to invest by diluting the effect of management’s pre-existing reputation.
This study provides valuable insights for research and practice. Contrary to the
previously reported findings on the endurance of management reputation (Cianci and
Kaplan, 2010), findings from this study suggest that detection of deception by a DA can
dilute the positive effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’ judgment
and decision making. Based on EVT, management’s pre-existing reputation establishes
expectations about disclosure quality and these expectations are used as a baseline to
assess disclosure credibility. The violation of these expectations affects the
communication outcomes between managers and investors, and ultimately affects
investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility. Findings from this study provide support
for EVT’s predictions and suggest that EVT can provide valuable insight on how
investors’ assess disclosure credibility.
This study also contributes to practice by addressing some of the concerns about
the dissemination of erroneous information in capital markets via new channels of
disclosure. Findings from this study suggest that investors can mitigate the risks
associated with video disclosure by using deception detection DAs. From the investors’
perspective, investors will be able to detect deception at an early stage and improve their
decisions. From the manager’s perspective, once these DAs become widely accepted,
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managers may avoid making deceptive statements when making video disclosures.
Managers may not engage in deceptive techniques knowing that investors are capable of
detecting their deception (Rogers and Stocken, 2005).

Background
The rapid expansion of social media and recent technological advances has
changed the flow and nature of information in capital markets. Investors can now quickly
access a significant amount of information with much less effort. Corporations are also
able to reach a significantly higher number of current or potential investors. Social media
is becoming a communication tool that corporate management and investors are using to
communicate with each other (Blankespoor et al., 2014). The benefits and drawbacks
from enhanced communication through social media are still unclear. For example, while
social media and technological advances increase the communication between managers
and investors, managers can use these new communication media to manipulate or
control investors’ impressions. Video disclosure is one of these new communication
media that managers can use opportunistically to reach investors.
Managers are now able to broadcast a video at any time to communicate directly
with investors. For example, when Nokia announced its alliance with Microsoft as part of
its new strategy, the market reacted negatively. Stephen Elop, CEO of Nokia at the time,
scheduled two meetings (one with specialist journalists and the other with financial
analysts) in an attempt to “change the market’s mind”. Both of these meeting were
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broadcast live and were publically available (for more details, see Whittington and YakisDouglas, 2012).
Recent evidence show that investors react differently to this new form of
disclosure in comparison to traditional disclosure methods. Investors make different
decisions when disclosures are communicated via video rather than text (Elliott et al.,
2012). Managers can behave opportunistically and use these video disclosures to
influence investors’ decisions to their advantage. For example, when an error occurs and
managers take responsibility for the error, they can gain more trust from their investors
through video disclosure rather than text disclosure (Elliott et al., 2012).
In an effort to adjust to technological changes and regulate corporate disclosure in
social media, the SEC has recently allowed corporations to post their corporate
disclosures on social media web sites such as Facebook and Twitter as long as investors
are informed in advance of the types of media that will be used. However, informing
investors about the location of information does not protect them from the content of the
information. The current regulatory model does not protect investors from the new risks
that have emerged from social media and technological advances.
While research in video disclosure is in its infancy, recent evidence from Larcker
and Zakolyukina (2012) and Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012) suggests that the content
of video disclosure is not free from deceptive statements and that managers can use video
disclosure to deceive investors. This literature also suggests that deception can be
extracted from CEOs disclosure. For example, linguistic features in conference calls can
be used to detect whether managers are deceitful or truthful during these conference calls
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(Larcker and Zakolyukina, 2012). Similarly, the voice of managers, when answering
analysts’ questions in Q&A sessions on conference calls, can be analyzed to infer
managers’ affective state (Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2012)1 or to predict the likelihood
of financial misreporting (Hobson et al., 2012).
Due to technological advances, new tools are available that investors can use to
improve their decision making model such as voice analysis and facial expression
software. For example, voice analysis software such as Layered Voice Analysis (LVA)
can be used to extract deception from vocal cues. However, several studies that have
employed voice analysis software reported that these DAs are no better than random
guesses to detect deception (for a discussion, see Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2012).
Deception detection DAs that focus on facial expressions represent a more powerful
approach to detect deception. “… [T]echnological advances have increased the
availability of video in addition to audio. Exploring facial expressions as yet another
channel of non-verbal managerial communication in the context of financial markets
would be a fruitful avenue for future research” (Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2012, pg.
38).

Negative affect occurs when managers experience cognitive dissonance when answering analysts’
questions. While not necessarily deceptive, cognitive dissonance when answering analysts’ questions
(negative state) is a sign that managers may be hiding information from investors. “If the manager has
private information that is inconsistent with her own beliefs regarding her competence, an uncomfortable
emotional state will arise from this dissonance” (Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2012, pg. 7).
1
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Hypothesis Development and Theoretical Framework
There are many reasons why individuals are not able to see through deceptive
behavior. First, most people suffer from a “truth bias”, a tendency to assume that what
they are told is true. Second, deceivers do not exhibit one single behavioral clue upon
which individuals can focus. People are unable to process all indicators of deceptive
behavior at once (Jensen et al., 2008). Differences between truth tellers and deceivers can
be detected through nonverbal cues (e.g., gestures, eye contact, head movements), verbal
cues (e.g., linguistics), and physiological changes (e.g., heart rate, brain activity). These
clues are transitory (Jenson et al., 2005) and occur simultaneously. The complexity of
decoding the deception cues renders deception detection a cognitively challenging task,
even for deception detection experts.
Contrary to humans, DAs do not suffer from cognitive limitation. DAs can be
programmed to combine behavioral clues to capture deception and assess whether an
individual is being deceptive or not. For example, a deception detection DA can conduct
linguistic and kinesics analyses simultaneously and generate a score for each (Jenson et
al., 2010).
Deception detection DAs look for behavioral differences between deceivers and
non-deceivers, which can be either verbal or non-verbal. Non-verbal cues are a more
powerful tool to detect deception because they are less likely to be rehearsed and they
represent “…unconsciously ‘leaked’ gestures…” (Meyer, 2010; pg. 75). Even in cases
when the deceiver is an expert in deception and rehearses his/her gesture to avoid gestural
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leakages, some leakages are very difficult to control such as the eye’s orbiting muscle or
pupil dilation (Meyer, 2010).
Several prototypes and existing deception recognition DAs are available such as
polygraphs (measures pulse and breathing), electroencephalograms (measures brain
activity), thermal scanners (measures the blood flow), sniffer test (measure the level of
stress hormones), pupilometer (measure pupil dilatation), eye trackers (measures eye
movements), and Magnetic Resonance Imaging. Some of these tools cannot reasonably
be used to detect managers’ deception. For example, injecting managers with a solution
and placing electrodes on their bodies would be considered unreasonable. Nevertheless,
recent technological advances in deception detection techniques are not as invasive.
Some deception detection DAs are capable of detecting deception without the deceiver’s
awareness of their presence (Jenson et al., 2010). These DAs can capture changes in
behavior through a camera’s lenses. By just videotaping someone, DAs can capture clues
of deception. Jenson et al. (2010) built a prototype called BAP that is capable of detecting
deception through linguistic and kinesics analysis. Evidence from their study shows that
experts’ and novices’ ability to detect deception increased by using BAP. Such a
deception detection DA can be useful to capital market participants if they incorporate
the information from the DA into their decisions.
Figure 1 presents the theoretical model regarding the effect of a deception
detection DA and management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility. As will be discussed below, DA output and management’s preexisting reputation are hypothesized to affect investors’ perceptions of disclosure
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credibility through management credibility. Also, the effect of management’s preexisting reputation on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility through
management credibility is conditional on whether the deception detection DA detects
deception.
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Figure 1: Theoretical Model
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Expectation Violation Theory (EVT) sets forth theory regarding individuals’
behavioral reactions to expectancy violations (Burgoon and Hale, 1988; Burgoon, 1993).
The theory proposes that, in a communication process, receivers have certain
expectancies about the communicator’s behavior. These expectancies can be formed from
(1) social norms or (2) known idiosyncrasies of the communicator (Burgoon and Hale,
1988). When individuals do not have information about the communicators’
characteristics, they form their expectancies based on societal norms alone (Burgoon and
Hale, 1988). These norms define how an individual is expected to behave. The
communicator’s behavior can either confirm or disconfirm these expectations. When a
communicator disconfirms these expectancies, an expectancy violation occurs. The
violation causes the receiver to assign a positive or negative valence to the violation.
When the communicator’s actual behavior is better than expected, the violation is
positive; when the communicator’s actual behavior is worse than expected, that violation
is negative. The valence of the violation determines whether the communication between
the receiver and the communicator will have a negative or positive outcome (Burgoon
and Hale, 1988; Burgoon, 1993). These outcomes include receivers’ impressions about
the communicator (Burgoon, 1993).
Managers communicate information to investors and investors determine whether
management’s communications deviate from expectancies set by social norms. When
investors do not have access to information about management, most investors have an a
priori expectation, from the social norm, that management will behave in an ethical
manner and communicate information truthfully (e.g., Koonce et al., 2010). If investors

26

have access to a deception detection DA, the DA may provide information that confirms
or disconfirms their expectation regarding the truthfulness of the communication and
affects their assessment of management credibility. If the deception detection DA does
not detect deception, investors’ expectancies will be confirmed and no expectancy
violation occurs. However, when the deception detection DA detects deceptive behavior,
an expectancy violation occurs. The sign of the violation is negative because
management does not meet the standards set by social norms. The negative violation will
have negative consequences on the communication outcome, including management
credibility.
Investors’ expectations about managers’ behavior is not always based on social
norm alone. Investors may have access to information about management’s pre-existing
reputation (e.g., Cianci and Kaplan, 2010). Management reputation is built through time
and can be good or bad. When investors have access to this type of information about
management, their expectations about managers’ behavior is based on social norm and on
whether managers have a good or bad pre-existing reputation (Burgoon and Hale, 1988).
Since investors may have access to management’s pre-existing reputation, this
information becomes critical to understanding investors’ perceptions of management
credibility. Investors’ expectancy violation becomes dependent, not only on the
expectation set by the social norm, but also on expectations built from management’s preexisting reputation (Burgoon and Hale, 1988). Based on expectations formed from
accessing information about management pre-existing reputation alone, investors do not
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expect (do expect) managers with a good (bad) pre-existing reputation to exhibit
deceptive behavior.
When investors’ expectations are formed from both social norm and management
pre-existing reputation, managers are not expected to exhibit deceptive behavior.
Additionally, expectations for managers with a good pre-existing reputation are higher
than expectations for managers with a bad pre-existing reputation. Expectation violations
occur only when a deception detection DA detects deceptive behavior. The magnitude of
the violation depends on whether managers have a good or bad pre-existing reputation
(Burgoon and Hale, 1988). When deception is detected for managers with a good (bad)
pre-existing reputation, the expectations from the social norm and management
reputation are both violated (only the expectations from the social norm are violated).
Therefore, the magnitude of the violation should be stronger when managers have a good
pre-existing reputation than when managers have a bad pre-existing reputation and
deception is detected.
Based on EVT, investors’ perceptions of management credibility are a function of
management’s pre-existing reputation. Managers with a good (bad) pre-existing
reputation have higher (lower) management credibility than managers with a bad (good)
pre-existing reputation (Burgoon and Hale, 1988; Burgoon, 1993). Whether managers
have a good or bad pre-existing reputation, deception detection should reduce investors’
perceptions of management credibility. Nevertheless, deception detection should cause a
stronger expectation violation for managers with a good pre-existing reputation than for
managers with a bad pre-existing reputation. Therefore, deception detection should dilute
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the effect of management pre-existing reputation on management credibility. In other
words, the effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’ perceptions of
management credibility is conditional on whether the DA detects deception such that
management pre-existing reputation will have a weaker effect on management credibility
when the DA detects deception than when the DA fails to detect deception.
H1:

Management’s pre-existing reputation will have a weaker effect on
management credibility when the DA detects deception than when the DA
fails to detect deception.

Mercer (2004) argues that management credibility and disclosure credibility are
two separate constructs. She states that “…management credibility is one factor, but not
the only factor that affects a disclosure’s credibility” (pg. 186). She argues that
management credibility has a direct effect on disclosure credibility. Investors are more
likely to believe disclosures from managers with higher management credibility than
from managers with lower management credibility.
Evidence from the broader source credibility literature provides support for the
effect of source credibility on message persuasiveness such that highly credible sources
are more persuasive than sources with lower credibility (for a literature review, see
Pornpitakpan, 2004). Recipients of messages can build a resistance against messages
received from low credibility sources because they are forewarned that the message may
be unreliable (Greenberg and Miller, 1966). Evidence from the source credibility
literature suggests that the effect of management credibility on disclosure credibility may
be more prevalent in video disclosure contexts due to media richness effects (Andreoli
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and Worchel, 1987; Wu and Shaffer, 1987). The effectiveness of source trustworthiness
(a component of management credibility) on message persuasiveness is not consistent
across different communication medium. Andreoli and Worchel (1987) reported that
trustworthy communicators were most persuasive through television (more than radio or
print)2. Also, Wu and Shaffer (1987) reported that the effect of source credibility on
message persuasiveness depended on whether the audience has a direct or indirect
experience with the object (the subject of discussion). When individuals have an indirect
experience about the object (they read about it, rather than directly interacting with it),
source credibility has an effect on message persuasion. However, when individuals have
a direct experience with the object, source credibility does not have such an effect on
persuasion3. These findings suggest that management credibility has a positive effect on
disclosure credibility. This relationship is also supported by EVT. According to EVT,
receivers use communicators’ characteristics such as management credibility to
determine whether the communication message is credible (Burgoon and Hale, 1988;
Burgoon, 1993). Therefore, management credibility is predicted to have a positive effect
on disclosure credibility.
H2:

Management credibility will have a positive effect on disclosure
credibility.

As discussed above, management’s pre-existing reputation creates behavioral
expectancies such that managers with a good pre-existing reputation are expected to
2

However, television is a double-edged sword; if the communicator is untrustworthy; television becomes
the least effective medium of persuasion.
3
In a financial disclosure setting, nonprofessional investors do not have direct experience with the object of
the disclosure. Managers have unique access to private information.
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communicate information credibly to investors. As EVT suggests, investors’ expectations
about the credibility of information communicated by managers are a function of the
expectations set by their knowledge of management’s pre-existing reputation. Therefore,
management’s pre-existing reputation has an effect on investors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility as well.
Since management’s pre-existing reputation impacts investors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility and management credibility, and management credibility impacts
investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility, the effect of management’s pre-existing
reputation on disclosure credibility should flow through management credibility. In other
words, management credibility should mediate the relationship between management’s
pre-existing reputation and disclosure credibility.
As theorized in H1, the strength of the effect of management’s pre-existing
reputation on investors’ perceptions of management credibility is conditional on whether
the deception detection DA detects deception. More precisely, deception detection
weakens the effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on management credibility.
Since the relationship between management’s pre-existing reputation and management
credibility is moderated by whether the deception detection DA detects deception, the
strength of the effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’ perceptions
of disclosure credibility, through management credibility, is also influenced by whether
the deception detection DA detects deception. The effect of management’s pre-existing
reputation on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility through management
credibility is weaker (stronger) when the deception detection DA detects (fails to detect)
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deception. In other words, deception detection dilutes the effect of management’s preexisting reputation, through management credibility, on disclosure credibility.
H3:

The effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility through management credibility will
be weaker when the DA detects deception than when it fails to detect
deception.

Methods
Design
To test the theoretical model advanced in this study, a 2X2 between-participants
experiment was conducted. The results of a deception detection DA and management’s
pre-existing reputation were the manipulated variables. The deception detection DA was
manipulated by varying whether the output of the DA assessed a 10 percent vs. 90
percent likelihood that the information in the video disclosure was deceptive.
Management’s pre-existing reputation was varied as either good or bad. In the good preexisting reputation condition, the CEO’s reputation was described favorably. In the bad
pre-existing reputation, the CEO’s reputation was described unfavorably. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment groups.

Procedures
Across all experimental conditions, participants were told that they had
accumulated $50,000 of personal savings and that they have decided to invest $10,000
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dollars of their savings by purchasing a company’s stock. Then, participants were
provided with experimental materials that described Armano and its CEO4. Armano was
described as an international confectionery manufacturer and retail operator led by Chief
Executive Officer, Dan Athens. Participants were provided with a brief news article
published by The Business Journal, which provided either a favorable or unfavorable
description of the CEO.
After providing the participants with a description of the CEO’s reputation, they
were provided information regarding Armano’s performance, including analysts’
consensus forecast, business news about Armano’s accomplishments, and summary
financial performance. Participants were then told that the CEO had announced an
earnings’ restatement. They were provided with a video of the CEO’s explanation for the
earnings’ restatement. In the video, the CEO stated that earnings were misstated because
the company relied on an external lease accounting expert when preparing the financial
statements.
After watching the video, participants were told that they have access to the
output of a deception detection DA that is capable of analyzing the video made by Dan
Athens and assessing the likelihood that the statement made by Dan Athens is deceptive.
The output of the DA’s analysis were manipulated across experimental conditions as
either a 10 percent or 90 percent likelihood that the CEO is being deceptive in his

4

The experimental materials for this study were adapted from Elliott et al. (2012) and Cianci and Kaplan
(2010). Several modifications were made to align the experimental materials with the purpose of this study.
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explanation for the restatement. Then, participants were provided with a set of questions
to measure their perceptions of management credibility and disclosure credibility.

Measured Variables
Participants’ perceptions of management credibility were measured using
questions adapted from Mercer (2005). Mercer (2005) measures the latent construct of
management credibility using three questions for competence and three questions for
trust. Four additional questions were developed; two questions for competence and two
for trust, resulting in a total of ten items. Each of these questions was anchored on a
seven point likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”.
To measure participants’ perceptions of disclosure credibility, five questions were
adapted from the message credibility literature. Disclosure credibility was measured by
asking participants whether the message was believable, accurate, trustworthy, unbiased,
and complete (Chesney and Su, 2010; Flanagin and Metzger, 2007, 2003, 2000). These
items were also measured on a seven point likert scale anchored from “strongly disagree”
to “strongly agree”.

Control Variables
Findings from previous studies suggest that investors’ financial literacy and DA
reliance should be accounted for when investigating the moderating effect of DA output
on judgment and decision making. Financial literacy consists of individuals’ financial
knowledge and their understanding of basic financial concepts. Several studies report that
individuals’ financial literacy has a significant effect on their financial decisions (Hilgert
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et al., 2003; Lusardi, 2008; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; Hung et al., 2009; Lusardi and
Mitchell, 2011; Van Rooij et al., 2011). In the context of this study, financially literate
individuals may have a higher level of skepticism about disclosure credibility than
individuals who are less financially literate. Also, financial literacy may outweigh the
effect of management’s pre-existing reputation and DA output on management credibility
and disclosure credibility. Moreover, research on financial literacy suggests that
individuals with lower financial literacy rely more on external advice than individuals
with higher financial literacy (Van Rooij et al., 2011). Financially literate individuals
may be less willing to rely on information received from DAs. To measure financial
literacy, five questions used by the Financial Industry Regulation Authority (FINRA) in
their national survey to assess investors’ financial literacy were adapted (FINRA, 2009a;
FINRA, 2009b; FINRA, 2012). Values in this measure range from “zero” (when
participants fail all financial literacy questions) to “five” (when participants answer all
financial literacy questions correctly).
Evidence from the literature on the effect of DAs on individuals’ decisions
suggests reliance on a DA impacts their decisions (e.g., Whitecotton, 1996; Arnold and
Sutton, 1998; Masselli et al., 2002; Hageman, 2010). Reliance is “…the degree to which
the user of a DA applies the aid and incorporates the recommendations of the aid during
judgment formulation…” (Arnold and Sutton, 1998 pg. 180). In extreme cases, where
reliance is null, the DA cannot have an effect on users’ decision making because the
output is not included in the decision making process. Therefore, reliance on a deception
detection DA should be accounted for when investigating the DAs impact on decision
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making. To measure DA reliance, participants were provided with a slightly modified
version of the reliance measure used by Hampton (2005). Participants were provided with
a seven-item measure anchored from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

Participants
Similar to Rennekamp (2012) Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) was used to
collect 3765 usable responses from nonprofessional investors6. Using MTurk participants
offers several advantages over using student participants. MTurk participants’
investment experience is not limited to educational experience, come from all 50 states
(Buhrmester et al., 2011), are intrinsically motivated to participate in research studies
without requiring high monetary compensation to perform a task (Buhrmester et al.,
2011, Farrell et al. 2014), and provide an inexpensive way of reaching externally valid
research participants (Brandon et al., 2014). Several studies have compared MTurk
participants’ decisions to decisions made by students. Findings from these studies suggest

5

Initial data collection resulted in 448 observations. Forty-two responses were deleted because they had
duplicate IP addresses indicating that some participants participated more than once. Nine responses had
missing data and were excluded. Also, 9 participants who spent an inordinately short amount of time
reading the experimental materials were excluded. In order to obtain equal cell sizes for the ANOVA
analysis, 12 observations were also excluded. Similarly to Lyubimov et al. (2013), a random number
generator was used to randomly exclude the required number of observations from each cell (running the
analyses without excluding the 12 observations to reach equal cell sizes does not change the results of this
study).
6
MTurk provides selection criteria to filter participants. Only US residents were able to take part in this
study. MTurk also provides statistics about the participants’ approval rate and the number of approved hits.
These statistics indicate the reputation and productivity of the participants. Evidence from the literature
suggests that participants with an approval rate above 95% have a high reputation and are, therefore, less
likely to fail attention check questions and to provide socially desirable answers than participants with
lower reputation. Similarly, participants who have more than 500 approved hits are highly productive and
provide higher quality data than participants with lower approved hits (Peer et al., 2013). Therefore, only
participants who have 500 approved hits or more and an approval rate above 95% were allowed to
participate in the experiment.
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that MTurk participants perform similarly to students (Paolacci et al., 2010; Horton et al.,
2011; Berinsky et al., 2012; Farrell et al., 2014) and to nonprofessional investors obtained
from survey firms (Farkas and Murthy 2014).
To ensure that all of the participants have investment experience, potential
participants who accessed the experiment were screened using the following questions:
1. Have you ever made personal investments in the common stock of a
company?
2. Approximately, how many years of personal investment experience do you
have?
3. Approximately, how many times have you purchased common stock of a
company as a personal investment?
Participants who had never made personal investments or had less than one year of
investment experience were directed away from the experiment. Participants who passed
the screening questions were allowed to proceed to the experiment.
On average, participants spent 20.31 minutes completing the experiment, and
were paid the equivalent of an hourly wage of $8.86. Demographics of the participants
are shown in Table 1. Of the participants, 65.2% are male, 34.8% are female, 88.0% have
used financial statements to evaluate a company’s performance, 73.4% have prior
business work experience, 17.0% have prior work experience in financial analysis, and
91.2% plan to invest in the common stock of a company at some time in the future. On
average, participants have 7.14 years of investing experience, have purchased common
stock 18.14 times, have taken 2.29 accounting classes, and have taken 1.99 finance
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classes. Results from the financial literacy measure indicate that 43.9% of participants
answered all of the questions correctly and the average score was 4.23 out of 5.00.
Table 1: Demographic Information
Mean
Average number of years of investing experience
Average number of times making purchases of common
stock
Average number of accounting classes taken
Average number of finance classes taken

7.14
18.14
2.29
1.99
Number

Gender
Male
Female
Age
< 30 years
30-39 years
40-49 years
50-59 years
60-69 years
>69 years
Ethnicity
Asian
African American
Hispanic
Native American
Caucasian
Others
Education
High School/ GED
Some College
2-year college degree
Undergraduate degree
Master degree
Doctoral degree
Used Financial Statements to Evaluate Company
Performance
Yes
No
38

Standard
Deviation
6.63
26.13
3.19
2.73
Percent

245
131

65.2%
34.8%

122
142
63
37
10
2

32.4%
37.8%
16.8%
9.8%
2.7%
0.5%

19
24
14
3
314
2

5.1%
6.4%
3.7%
0.8%
83.5%
0.5%

35
82
42
167
45
5

9.3%
21.8%
11.2%
44.4%
12.0%
1.3%

331
45

88.0%
12.0%

Number

Prior Business Work Experience (Average is 11.08
years)
Yes
No
Prior Work Experience in financial analysis (Average is
5.22 years)
Yes
No
Plan to Invest in Common Stock in Future
Yes
No
Financial Literacy Scores (Average is 4.23)
Participants who had five correct answers
Participants who had four correct answers
Participants who had three correct answers
Participants who had two correct answers
Participants who had one correct answers
Participants who had no correct answers

Percent

276
100

73.4%
26.6%

64
312

17.0%
83.0%

343
33

91.2%
8.8%

165
153
41
14
3
0

43.9%
40.7%
10.9%
3.7%
0.8%
0.0%

At the end of the experiment, participants were asked whether “there was a 90%
(or 10%) likelihood that the person in the downloaded video is being deceptive”.
Participants in the deception detected (deception not detected) condition should answer
yes (no) to this question. Participants who did not answer this question correctly were
directed away from the experiment. Participants were also asked, on a seven point likert
scale ranging from “Very Bad” to “Very Good”, whether The Business Journal suggested
that Dan Athens (the CEO) had a good or bad reputation. Participants in the good preexisting reputation condition believed that management reputation was higher (mean =
6.33; SD = 1.00) than participants in the bad pre-existing reputation condition (mean =
3.57; SD = 1.22). The difference between the two groups of participants is statistically
significant (p < 0.001).
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Results
Before testing the theoretical model, a principal component analysis with a
Promax rotation was conducted on the measures for DA reliance, management credibility
and disclosure credibility. Results from the principal component analysis suggest that
participants did not distinguish between disclosure credibility and the trust component of
management credibility. Items used to measure disclosure credibility and the trust
component of management credibility loaded strongly on one factor. As a result, the
measure of management credibility was limited to the competence component7. After,
deleting the trust component of management credibility, one item from disclosure
credibility and one item from management credibility loaded strongly on more than one
component. These items were deleted to eliminate strong cross loadings across the
components. Also, one reliance item was eliminated from the analysis because it did not
load on the reliance component. These results indicate that four items measure the
competence components of management credibility, four items measure disclosure
credibility, and six items measure DA reliance. Results from the principal component
analysis are reported in Table 2 Panel A.

7

To mitigate some of the content validity issues that are raised from collapsing the trust component of
management credibility, additional analyses were conducted with an alternative measure of management
credibility. Barton and Mercer (2005) measured management credibility by using analyst’s average
response on a one item measure for competence and a one item measure for trust. Similarly, responses on
whether investors believed that the manager is competent and whether the manager is trustworthy were
used to create an alternative measure for management credibility. Untabulated results of this analysis
suggest that conducting the analysis with an alternative measure of management credibility does not have
an impact on the results and provide assurance with regard to content validity issues.
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Table 2: Measurement Validation
Panel A: Principal Component Analysis (with Promax Rotation)

DA Reliance (1): I agree with the results of the deception detection software.
DA Reliance (2): I have confidence in the results of the deception detection
software.
DA Reliance (3): I incorporated the deception detection software's results into my
decisions.
DA Reliance (4): I relied on the results of the deception detection software.
DA Reliance (5): I believe that the deception detection software is capable of
detecting deception.
DA Reliance (6): The results of the deception detection software are convincing.
Management Credibility (1): I believe that Dan Athens is a competent person.
Management Credibility (2): I believe that Dan Athens is a knowledgeable person.
Management Credibility (3): I believe that Dan Athens is a qualified person.
Management Credibility (4): I have confidence in Dan Athens' abilities.
Disclosure Credibility (1): The explanation for the earnings restatement is accurate.
Disclosure Credibility (2): The explanation for the earnings restatement is
trustworthy.
Disclosure Credibility (3): The explanation for the earnings restatement is
unbiased.
Disclosure Credibility (4): The explanation for the earnings restatement is
complete.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
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Components
1
2
3
-.034
.824 -.125
.881

-.172

-.079

.849

-.224

-.309

.829

-.225

-.296

.873

-.153

-.189

.928
-.194
-.105
-.217
-.272
-.212

-.210
.883
.852
.921
.904
.610

-.213
.506
.322
.490
.592
.898

-.259

.593

.924

-.148

.350

.870

-.151

.399

.872

Panel B: Analyses for Discriminant and Convergent Validity
Average
Composite
Variance
Disclosure
DA
Management
Reliability
Extracted
Credibility
Reliance
Credibility
Disclosure
0.916
0.734
0.857
Credibility
0.933
0.699
-0.250
0.836
DA Reliance
Management
0.914
0.729
0.652
-0.251
0.854
Credibility
Bolded values on the diagonals indicate the square root of the Average Extracted Variance (AVE).
Italicized values represent interconstruct correlations
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To ensure discriminant validity and convergent validity for the three constructs,
the Average Extracted Variance (AVE) for each measure was examined. Results from
this analysis are reported in Table 2 Panel B. The AVE for each construct is greater than
.5 indicating an acceptable level of convergent validity. The square root of the AVE is
higher than any interconstruct correlations indicating an acceptable level of discriminant
validity. To check the internal validity of the measured constructs, composite reliability
was calculated. All measures have a composite reliability greater than .7 indicating an
acceptable level of internal reliability. These results suggest that the measures for
management credibility, disclosure credibility, and DA reliance have acceptable
psychometric properties. Participants’ average response on the items for each construct
was used to measure DA reliance, management credibility, and disclosure credibility8.
Table 3 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the four cells. H1, which
predicts that management’s pre-existing reputation has a weaker effect on management
credibility when the DA detects deception than when the DA fails to detect deception, is
tested using an ANCOVA9. Management’s pre-existing reputation (Bad/Good) and the
output of the deception detection DA (Deception Detected/ Deception not Detected) were
the independent variables, DA reliance and financial literacy were the covariates, and

8

The employed procedure assumes that the measured items do not include measurement errors. To account
for measurement errors within each item, factor scores for each construct were used instead of using the
average of participants’ responses. Untabulated results from this analysis suggest that accounting for
measurement error does not have an impact on the overall results.
9
Untabulated results show that participants’ demographic information do not differ significantly across the
experimental conditions and that two demographic variables had a significant relationship with the
dependent variable: the number of accounting courses had a significant relationship with investors’
perception of management credibility and participants’ highest level of education had a significant
relationship with investors’ perception of disclosure credibility. Adding these demographic variables to the
analyses does not have an impact on the overall results.
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management credibility was the dependent variable. The results of the ANCOVA
analysis are reported in Table 3 Panel B10. While not hypothesized, results from Table 3
suggest that the output of the DA has a significant (p < 0.001) effect on management
credibility11. Management credibility was significantly lower when the DA detects
deception (Mean = 4.99; SD = 1.20) than when the DA fails to detect deception (Mean =
5.86; SD = .92). The results also suggest that management’s pre-existing reputation has a
significant effect on management credibility such that management credibility is
significantly higher (p < 0.001) when managers have a good pre-existing reputation
(Mean = 5.66; SD = 1.13) than when managers have a bad-pre-existing reputation (Mean
= 5.19; SD =1.12). Of the two covariates, DA reliance has a significant effect and
financial literacy has no significant effect on management credibility.
Results from the ANCOVA analysis also show that there is a significant
interaction between management’s pre-existing reputation and DA output (p = 0.026). To
test whether management’s pre-existing reputation has a stronger effect on management
credibility when the deception detection DA fails to detect deception than when the
deception detection DA detects deception, two planned contrasts were conducted. The
first planned contrast was conducted to show that management credibility was highest
when the DA failed to detect deception for managers with a good pre-existing reputation.
The second contrast was conducted to show that participants have higher perceptions of
management credibility for managers with a bad pre-existing reputation when the

10

Since the equal cell size assumption has been met, the equal variance assumption can be relaxed (Glass et
al., 1972).
11
All p-values are one tailed and the cutoff for significance is .05.
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deception detection DA fails to detect deception than when the deception detection DA
detects deception.
Results of the planned contrast are reported on Table 3 Panel C. Results from the
first and second planned contrast indicate that the interaction between management’s preexisting reputation and deception detection is ordinal with management’s pre-existing
reputation having a stronger effect on management credibility when the deception
detection DA fails to detect deception than when the deception detection DA detects
deception. Therefore, these results provide support that deception detection moderates the
effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on management credibility set forth in
H1. The interaction between management’s pre-existing reputation and deception
detection is plotted in Figure 2.
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Table 3: Management Credibility
Panel A: Management Credibility – Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]
DA Output
Deception Detected
Deception Not
Management’s Pre-existing
Detected
Reputation
5.16
6.17
High
(1.23)
(.75)
[94]
[94]
4.84
5.55
Low
(1.15)
(.98)
[94]
[94]
4.99
5.86
Average
(1.20)
(.92)
[188]
[188]
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Average
5.66
(1.13)
[188]
5.19
(1.12)
[188]
[376]

Panel B: ANCOVA Model of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable = Management Credibility)
Source
S.S
d.f.
M.S.
F-Ratio
p-value*
Management’s Pre18.171
1
18.171
17.074
<0.001
existing Reputation
54.139
1
54.139
50.871
<0.001
DA Output
Management’s Preexisting Reputation *
4.042
1
4.042
3.798
0.026
DA Output
Covariates:
8.319
1
8.319
7.817
0.003
DA Reliance
Financial Literacy
1.787
1
1.787
1.679
0.098
393.774
370
1.064
Error
11573.438
376
Total
*All p-values are one-tailed
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Panel C: Planned Contrast Analyses
Value of
Contrast
Contrast
Good Pre-existing
Reputation/Deception
Not Detected > All
2.9707
other conditions (+3,
-1, -1,-1)
Bad Pre-existing
Reputation/Deception
Not Detected > Bad
Pre-existing
-0.7101
Reputation/Deception
Detected (+1, -1, 0,
0)

Std. Error

t

df

p-value

0.30599

9.708

239.740

< 0.001

0.15566

-4.562

181.767

< 0.001
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Figure 2: The Moderating Effect of DA Output on Management Credibility
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H2 and H3 are tested using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013). PROCESS has several
built-in models to test mediation and moderated mediation models. To test H2 and set the
ground for testing H3, a mediation analysis was conducted. Results from the mediation
analysis indicate whether management credibility has a direct effect on disclosure
credibility (H2) and whether management credibility mediates the relationship between
management’s pre-existing reputation and disclosure credibility. To test the mediation
model, management’s pre-existing reputation was defined as the predictor, management
credibility was defined as the mediator, financial literacy was defined as the covariate12,
and disclosure credibility was defined as the outcome variable. Results of the mediation
analysis, reported in Table 4 Panel A, indicate that management credibility has a
significant effect (p < 0.001) on disclosure credibility. Therefore, H2 is supported.
In order to test whether management credibility mediates the relationship between
management’s pre-existing reputation and disclosure credibility, the indirect effect of
management’s pre-existing reputation on disclosure credibility must also be significant.
Results reported in Table 4 Panel B show that the indirect effect is statistically significant
with the bootstrapped confidence intervals ranging from a low of 0.174 to a high of
0.451. The absence of zero within the bootstrapped confidence interval indicates that the
indirect effect is statistically significant13. These results provide the foundation for testing
the moderating effect of deception detection DA on the mediation.

12

DA output is not part of this model. Reliance on DAs was not included as a covariate. Including DA
reliance as a covariate does not change the overall results of the model.
13
The bootstrap analysis is based on 10,000 samples. Also, the bootstraps reported in this study are biascorrected confidence intervals and are set to a confidence level of 90% (the equivalent of one tailed tests).
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Table 4: Mediation Analysis of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Investors’ Perceptions of Disclosure Credibility
Panel A: Direct Effect of Management Credibility on Disclosure Credibility

(Constant)
Predictor:
Pre-existing reputation
Mediator:
Management Credibility
Covariates:
Financial Literacy

Coefficient

SE

t

Sig.
(One-tailed)

LLCI

ULCI

1.110

0.386

2.880

0.002

0.475

1.746

0.469

0.117

4.003

<0.001

0.276

0.662

0.638

0.051

12.505

<0.001

0.554

0.723

-0.219

0.068

-3.222

0.001

-0.331

-0.107

Panel B: The Indirect Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Investors’ Perceptions of Disclosure
Credibility
Bootstrapped
Bootstrapped
Mediator
Effect
Boot SE
LLCI
ULCI
Management
0.305
0.084
0.174
0.451
Credibility
LLCI: Lower level confidence interval
ULCI: Upper level confidence interval
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To test the moderating effect of the DA’s output on the indirect effect of
management’s pre-existing reputation on disclosure credibility, a moderated mediation
analysis was conducted. In this analysis, disclosure credibility was defined as the
outcome variable, management credibility was defined as the mediator, management’s
pre-existing reputation was defined as the predictor, DA output was defined as the
moderator, and DA reliance and financial literacy were defined as the covariates. The
first step in this analysis is to assess the direct effects of management’s pre-existing
reputation and DA output (as well as the interaction) on management credibility. Results
in Table 5 Panel A are consistent with the ANCOVA analysis. Management’s preexisting reputation has a significant (p < 0.001) positive effect on management
credibility, DA output has a significant (p < 0.001) negative effect on management
credibility, and the interaction between management’s pre-existing reputation and DA
output is statistically significant (p = 0.026).
The second step in this analysis is to assess the direct effects of management’s
pre-existing reputation and DA output (as well as the interaction) on disclosure
credibility. As shown in Table 5 Panel B, the results indicate that management’s preexisting reputation has a significant (p < 0.001) positive effect on disclosure credibility,
DA output has a significant (p < 0.001) negative effect on disclosure credibility, and the
interaction between disclosure credibility and DA output is not significant (p = 0.069).
As shown in Table 5 Panel C, an examination of the conditional direct effects of
management’s pre-existing reputation on disclosure credibility across the two levels of
the DA output indicates that management’s pre-existing reputation has a significant effect
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on disclosure credibility, regardless of whether the DA detects deception (p = 0.005) or
not (p < 0.001). Nevertheless, the effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on
disclosure credibility is smaller (0.390) when the DA detects deception than when the
deception detection DA fails to detect deception (0.704). This analysis indicates DA
output dilutes the direct effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on disclosure
credibility for both good and bad management’s pre-existing reputation.
To assess the conditional indirect effect of management’s pre-existing reputation
on disclosure credibility, the indirect effect was examined across the two levels of the
moderator. Table 5 Panel D indicates that management credibility mediates the effect of
management’s pre-existing reputation on disclosure credibility when the deception
detection DA fails to detect deception (Bootstrapped lower level confidence interval
(Bootstrapped LLCI) = 0.181; Bootstrapped upper level confidence interval
(Bootstrapped ULCI) = 0.429). When the deception detection DA detects deception, the
mediating effect of management credibility becomes non-significant (Bootstrapped LLCI
= -0.021; Bootstrapped ULCI = 0.246). Thus, deception detection dilutes the effect of
management’s pre-existing reputation on management credibility. An examination of the
index of moderated mediation shown in Panel E indicates that the indirect effect of
management’s pre-existing reputation on disclosure credibility is significantly different
between the two levels of the moderator, DA output (Bootstrapped LLCI = -0.368;
Bootstrapped ULCI = -0.040). These results suggest that DA output dilutes the direct and
indirect effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on disclosure credibility.
Therefore, these results provide support for the moderated mediation set forth in H3.
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Table 5: The Moderated Indirect Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Investors’ Perceptions of Disclosure
Credibility
Panel A: The Direct Effects of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Management Credibility

(Constant)
Pre-existing Reputation
DA Output
Pre-existing Reputation*DA
Output
Covariates:
DA Reliance
Financial Literacy

Coefficient

SE

t

Sig.
(One-tailed)

LLCI

ULCI

5.713
0.654
-0.572

0.353
0.151
0.158

16.177
4.336
-3.628

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

5.131
0.405
-0.831

6.296
0.902
-0.312

-0.422

0.217

-1.949

0.026

-0.779

-0.065

-0.128
0.110

0.043
0.061

-3.006
1.797

-0.199
0.009

-0.058
0.210

LLCI

ULCI

1.984
0.365
0.457
-1.126

3.459
0.532
0.951
-0.614

-0.662

0.0336

-0.114
-0.315

0.026
-0.113

0.003
0.098

Panel B: The Direct Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Disclosure Credibility
Sig.
Coefficient
SE
t
(One-tailed)
(Constant)
2.721
0.447
6.085
<0.001
Management Credibility
0.449
0.050
8.901
<0.001
Pre-existing Reputation
0.704
0.150
4.700
<0.001
DA Output
-0.870
0.155
-5.601
<0.001
Pre-existing Reputation*DA
-0.314
0.211
-1.490
0.069
output
DA Reliance
-0.044
0.042
-1.03
0.152
Financial Literacy
-0.214
0.061
-3.493
<0.001
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Panel C: The Conditional Direct Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Investors’ Perceptions of
Disclosure Credibility
DA output
Deception Not
Detected
Deception
Detected

Effect

SE

t

Sig.
(One-tailed)

LLCI

ULCI

0.704

0.150

4.700

<0.001

0.457

0.951

0.390

0.150

2.607

0.005

0.143

0.637

Panel D: The Conditional Indirect Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Investors’ Perceptions of
Disclosure Credibility
DA Output
Effect
SE
Bootstrapped LLCI
Bootstrapped ULCI
Deception Not
0.293
0.075
0.181
0.429
Detected
Deception Detected
0.104
0.081
-0.021
0.246
Panel E: The Index of Moderated Mediation
Mediator
Index
Management
-0.189
Credibility

SE

Bootstrapped LLCI

Bootstrapped ULCI

0.099

-0.368

-0.040
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Supplemental Analyses
One of the implied assumptions of this study is that investors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility have a significant and positive effect on investors’ willingness to
invest. The experimental materials included a measure of willingness to invest.
Participants were asked to choose an amount between $0 and $10,000 to invest in the
hypothetical company. This question was used to explore whether the investigated
relationships in this study have an impact on willingness to invest. To investigate this
matter, the data was re-analyzed with the dollar amount that participants chose to invest
as the dependent variable (instead of disclosure credibility). The results of the analysis
are reported in Table 6. Overall, the results suggest that the findings from using
willingness to invest as the dependent variable are consistent with the findings from using
disclosure credibility as the dependent variable.

56

Table 6: The Moderated Indirect Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Willingness to Invest through
Management Credibility
Panel A: The Direct Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Management Credibility

(Constant)
Pre-existing Reputation
DA Output
Pre-existing Reputation*DA
Output
DA Reliance
Financial Literacy

Coefficient

SE

t

Sig.
(One-tailed)

LLCI

ULCI

5.713
0.654
-0.572

0.353
0.151
0.158

16.177
4.336
-3.628

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

5.131
0.405
-0.831

6.296
0.902
-0.312

-0.422

0.217

-1.949

0.026

-0.779

-0.065

-0.121
0.082

0.043
0.063

-2.796
1.296

0.003
0.098

-0.193
-0.022

-0.050
0.186

LLCI

ULCI

-1958.148
495.409
821.821
-618.861

1039.045
833.070
1825.626
422.301

-1529.015

-115.546

-262.044
-270.611

22.210
140.03

Panel B: The Direct Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Willingness to Invest
Sig.
Coefficient
SE
t
(One-tailed)
(Constant)
-459.552
908.795
-0.506
0.307
Management Credibility
664.239
102.384
6.488
<0.001
Pre-existing Reputation
1323.723
304.370
4.349
<0.001
DA Output
-98.280
315.696
-0.311
0.378
Pre-existing Reputation*DA
-822.280
428.585
-1.919
0.028
Output
DA Reliance
-119.917
86.190
-1.391
0.083
Financial Literacy
-65.291
124.513
-0.524
0.300
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Panel C: The Conditional Direct Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Willingness to Invest
Sig.
DA Output
Effect
SE
t
LLCI
(One-tailed)
Deception Not Detected
1323.723
304.369
4.349
821.821
<0.001
Deception Detected
501.443
303.869
1.650
0.364
0.050

ULCI
1825.626
1002.522

Panel D: The Conditional Indirect Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Willingness to Invest
DA Output
Effect
SE
Bootstrapped LLCI
Bootstrapped ULCI
Deception Not
Detected
434.181
102.676
281.047
621.820
Deception Detected
153.890
119.318
-33.099
360.057
Panel E: The Index of Moderated Mediation
Mediator
Index
Management
Credibility
-280.291

SE

Bootstrapped LLCI

Bootstrapped ULCI

144.995

-537.471

-57.312
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In order to investigate the effect of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest
in the same model, an additional analysis was conducted. In this analysis, willingness to
invest was defined as the dependent variable, disclosure credibility was defined as the
mediating variable, management’s pre-existing reputation was defined as the predictor,
and DA output was defined as the moderating variable. Results from this analysis are
reported in Table 7. The results are generally consistent with the previously reported
findings with the following exceptions. First, the conditional direct effect of
management’s pre-existing reputation did not have a significant impact on willingness to
invest (p = 0.176) when the deception detection DA detected deception. Second, the
indirect effect of management’s pre-existing reputation had a significant effect on
willingness to invest (Bootstrapped LLCI = 184.071; Bootstrapped ULCI = 612.555)
when the deception detection DA detected deception. The results from this analysis also
suggest the DA output dilutes the direct and indirect effect of management’s pre-existing
reputation on willingness to invest. These results provide evidence that disclosure
credibility affects willingness to invest and that the effect of the DA is not limited to
investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility, but also affects investors’ willingness to
invest.
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Table 7: The Moderated Indirect Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Willingness to Invest through Disclosure
Credibility
Panel A: The Direct Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Disclosure Credibility

(Constant)
Pre-existing reputation
DA output
Pre-existing reputation*DA
output
DA Reliance
Financial Literacy

Coefficient

SE

t

Sig.
(One-tailed)

LLCI

ULCI

5.284
0.997
-1.127

0.377
0.161
0.168

14.025
6.201
-6.704

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

4.662
0.732
-1.404

5.905
1.262
-0.849

-0.503

0.231

-2.180

0.015

-0.884

-0.123

-0.098
-0.177

0.046
0.067

-2.121
-2.636

0.017
0.004

-0.174
-0.288

-0.022
-0.066

LLCI

ULCI

-2082.01
610.966
496.139
-142.415

673.350
918.202
1494.762
909.226

-1404.49

-30.812

-262.764
-76.094

11.923
325.295

Panel B: The Direct effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Willingness to Invest
Sig.
Coefficient
SE
t
(One-tailed)
(Constant)
-704.331
835.468
-0.843
0.200
Disclosure Credibility
764.584
93.159
8.207
<0.000
Pre-existing reputation
995.450
302.798
3.288
<0.001
DA output
383.406
318.873
1.202
0.115
Pre-existing reputation*DA
-717.651
416.520
-1.723
0.043
output
DA Reliance
-125.421
83.289
-1.506
0.067
Financial Literacy
124.600
121.707
1.024
0.153

60

Panel C: The Conditional Direct Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Investors’ Perceptions of
Disclosure Credibility
Sig.
DA output
Effect
SE
t
LLCI
ULCI
(One-tailed)
Deception Not Detected
995.450
302.798
3.288
496.139
1494.762
0.001
Deception Detected
277.799
297.616
0.933
0.176
-212.968
768.566
Panel D: The Conditional Indirect Effect of Management’s Pre-existing Reputation on Investors’ Perceptions of
Disclosure Credibility
DA output
Effect
SE
Bootstrapped LLCI
Bootstrapped ULCI
Deception Not
Detected

762.453

151.736

536.692

1042.503

Deception Detected

377.534

129.460

184.071

612.555

SE

Bootstrapped LLCI

Bootstrapped ULCI

181.372

-699.252

-100.574

Panel E: The Index of Moderated Mediation
Mediator
Index
Disclosure
-384.92
Credibility
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Summary of Findings
Findings from this study suggest that deception detection dilutes the direct and
indirect effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on investors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility. Investors’ perceptions of management credibility and disclosure
credibility are significantly higher when managers have a good pre-existing reputation
than when manager have a bad pre-existing reputation. When considering management’s
pre-existing reputation and the DA output jointly, management’s pre-existing reputation
has a weaker effect on investors’ perceptions of management credibility when the DA
detects deception than when it fails to detect deception. These findings provide support
for the theoretical framework presented in this paper. Deception detection causes a
stronger expectation violation when managers have a good pre-existing reputation than
when managers have a bad pre-existing reputation. The theoretical framework in this
study also suggests that the effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on disclosure
credibility is mediated by management credibility and moderated by the output of the
deception detection DA. The results provide strong support for the predicted effect of the
deception detection DA on the relationship between management’s pre-existing
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reputation and investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility through management
credibility.

Conclusions
Technological developments have increased the spread of video disclosure in
capital markets. The spread of this type of disclosure increases the risk of providing
investors with deceptive information. Investors’ inability to detect deception by
themselves prevents them from excluding deceptive information from their information
set. Technological developments have not only facilitated the transmission of deceptive
information in capital markets, but also have created new ways to detect deception. One
of the techniques currently being developed is the use of deception detection DAs that are
capable of detecting deception by capturing clues of deceptive behavior. These DAs can
be the solution that capital markets have been waiting for to reduce the spread of
misleading information. However, unless the output of these DAs is accounted for in
investors’ decision making, these DAs will fail at improving investors’ decision making.
In other word, unless these DAs impact investors’ behavior, they will not prevent
investors from including misleading information in their information set.
Investors are currently using informational clues such as information about
management’s pre-existing reputation to assess management credibility and disclosure
credibility. Deception detection DAs may not be efficient if investors put more weight on
their perceptions of management’s pre-existing reputation than on the DA. More
precisely, investors remain free to discredit the output of the DA. In that case,
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management’s pre-existing reputation may overcome the DA output, and investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility may become dependent on management’s preexisting reputation alone. History has shown that a good pre-existing reputation is
misleading. The biggest fraud cases discovered in the U.S. were committed by managers
who established a good reputation. If deception could have been caught at an early stage,
some of the negative effects of the fraud cases on U.S. capital markets might have been
prevented.
The theoretical framework introduced in this study provides evidence that
deception detection DAs dilute the effect of management’s pre-existing reputation on
disclosure credibility such that the effect of management’s pre-existing reputation
weakens when the deception detection DA detects deception. This evidence suggests that
investors will include the DA output in their information set and improve their decision
by reducing their perceptions of disclosure credibility for deceptive information. This
evidence also provides support for using EVT in a capital market setting. As predicted by
EVT, deception detection causes a stronger expectancy violation when managers have a
good pre-existing reputation and the effect of this violation is reflected in their
perceptions of management credibility and disclosure credibility.
As with all studies, this study has some limitations. As discussed in the results
section, the trust component of management credibility and disclosure credibility load
together under one component. Limiting the measure of management credibility to its
competence component suggests that the measure employed in this study may suffer from
content validity issues. This finding provides room for future research on whether the

64

theoretical framework advanced by Mercer (2004) can be tested using the measures for
management credibility that are currently available. Her theoretical framework suggests
that management credibility is an antecedent to investors’ perceptions of disclosure
credibility. Findings in this study suggest that the latent measures for management and
disclosure credibility may suffer from discriminant validity issues. Future research should
investigate whether competence by itself can be used to measure management credibility
and whether a better measure than competence and trust can be created to mitigate the
discriminant validity issue between management and disclosure credibility.
Future research should also investigate whether specific features of the DA such
as the accuracy of deception detection may impact investors’ reactions to the output of
the DA. For example, in the deception detected condition, participants are told that there
is a 90% likelihood that the person in the downloaded video is being deceptive. Whereas,
in the deception not detected condition, participants are told that there is a 10% likelihood
that the person in the downloaded video is being deceptive. Future research can
investigate whether the effect of the output of the deception detection DA changes when
the DA’s accuracy is lowered to 80% vs. 20%, 70% vs.30%, or 60% vs.40%. Lowering
the accuracy of the DA may dilute the size of the violation and, therefore, the
effectiveness of these DAs.
Moreover, CEOs understanding of such technology remains unknown. Future
research should investigate whether CEOs ex-ante knowledge about the availability and
use of such technology affects investors’ reaction to the DA. For example, future research
can investigate whether detecting deception for a CEO who knows ex-ante that the video
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disclosure is going to be analyzed has a similar effect on investors as detecting deception
for a CEO who does not know ex-ante that the video disclosure is going to be analyzed.
CEOs compliance to such technology may affect investors’ beliefs about the accuracy of
the DA.
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STUDY 2
GETTING CAUGHT “SUGAR COATING”: THE BEHAVIORAL
IMPLICATIONS OF DETECTING LINGUISTIC MANIPULATIONS
ON NONPROFESSIONAL INVESTORS’ DECISIONS
Introduction
Companies communicate with potential and current investors through corporate
reports. Investors extract information from these corporate reports to make investment
decisions. The accuracy of investors’ decisions is dependent on the transparency and
truthfulness of the information that they have extracted from these reports (e.g., O’
Conner, 2013). One of the issues with corporate reporting is that managers have private
access to information and do not always exhibit transparency when reporting information
about their company (e.g., Larcker and Zakolyukina, 2012). When managers engage in
financial misreporting, investors may make their decisions based on erroneous
information and may make poor investment decisions.
Transparency in financial reporting is a concern that regulators continually try to
address in order to protect investors (e.g., Turner, 2001). While regulators have tried to
address this issue by implementing mechanisms such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
reporting transparency remains difficult to attain, especially in areas such as corporate
narratives where information is difficult to verify. The narrative portion of the annual
report has witnessed significant growth (Francis, 2002; Davis et al., 2012). Under the
current regulatory model, these narratives are not subject to the same level of monitoring
as quantitative information in annual reports (e.g., Bedard, et al., 2012). The lack of
regulatory monitoring creates concerns regarding the consistency between quantitative
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and qualitative information (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003) and the possibility of
dissemination of misleading information in financial markets.
Evidence from the accounting literature suggests that managers strategically use
linguistic manipulations to “sugar coat” corporate narratives. These linguistic
manipulations include tone (Henry, 2008; Feldman et al., 2010; Schleicher and Walker,
2010; Roger et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2012), readability (Courtis, 2004; li, 2008;
Rennekamp, 2012), complexity (Miller, 2010), abstractedness and concreteness (Riley et
al., 2014), and vividness and pallidness (Hales et al., 2011). Prior research indicates that
the use of certain linguistics may be systematically related to environmental performance
(Cho et al. 2010), financial performance (Abrahamson and Amir, 1996; Schleicher and
Walker, 2010; Riley et al. 2014), or reputation (Geppert and Lawrence, 2008).
Recent evidence suggests that investors’ decisions are not solely impacted by the
content of corporate narratives, but by the linguistics used in these reports as well (Henry,
2008; Feldman et al., 2010; Hales et al., 2011; Rennekamp, 2012; Miller, 2010; Riley et
al., 2014). Investors react differently to disclosures with the same content, but written
with different linguistics. More importantly, investors are not aware of the effect of
linguistic manipulations on their decisions. They unconsciously react to changes in
linguistics (Rennekamp, 2012; Riley et al., 2014).
The literature also suggests that linguistics seem to be more influential on
nonprofessional investors (e.g., Miller, 2010). The literature divides investors into two
types: professional and nonprofessional investors. Professional investors are those who
have the necessary training to comprehend most of the quantitative information in
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corporate reports, who use more advanced valuation models (Maines and McDonald,
2000), and who tend to focus more on the quantitative proportion of annual reports, also
referred to as an “analytical bias” (Hofstedt, 1972). Nonprofessional investors do not
have the analytical skills of professional investors and are more likely to refer to the
narratives when drawing inferences about a company (Lee and Tweedie, 1975; Arnold et
al., 2010). Due to the lack of regulatory monitoring of corporate narratives,
nonprofessional investors’ need for narratives may expose them to a higher risk of
including misleading information in their decision making process. If investors are able
to see the bias in the linguistics of corporate reports, they may be able to revise their
judgment by excluding the biased information (e.g., Kelly et al., 2012). Using a DA that
is able to reveal the linguistics used in corporate reports may be one possible means for
nonprofessional investors to be able to adjust for the effect of linguistic manipulations.
There are several linguistic analysis tools that could be used in a DA to reveal
linguistic manipulations employed by managers. These linguistic analysis tools have been
used to predict future performance (Abrahamson and Amir, 1996), fraud (Goel et al.,
2010; Cecchini et al., 2010; Humpherys et al., 2011), and bankruptcy (Tennyson et al.,
1990; Smith and Taffler, 2000; Cecchini et al., 2010). Studies that have employed these
tools encouraged researchers, regulators and even auditors (Humpherys et al., 2011) to
use these techniques to measure the effect of linguistics and include them in research
models or agendas. Interestingly, except for Cecchini et al. (2010), most of these studies
did not highlight the potential benefit that investors may have from using these linguistic
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analysis techniques. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of using the
output of a linguistic analysis DA on investors’ decision making.
This study relies on Expectation Violation Theory (EVT) (Burgoon and Hale,
1988; Burgoon, 1993) to predict investors’ reactions to being alerted to linguistic
manipulations in corporate reports. EVT is a communication theory built on the
assumption that individuals create expectations about the communicator’s behavior based
on known idiosyncrasies or social norms. These expectations can either be confirmed or
disconfirmed. When disconfirmed, an expectation violation occurs and impacts the
outcome of the communication. Expectation violations can have a negative or positive
sign. When the communicator does not meet (exceeds) the receiver’s expectations, a
negative (positive) violation occurs. The sign of the violation impacts individuals’
decision making. The theory also suggests that the effect of the violation may depend on
information about the communicator. As a result, the effect of an expectation violation
may be weakened.
In this study, a 2X2 experiment was conducted to test the effect of revealing
linguistic manipulations on investors’ decision making. Managers’ incentives (incentive
vs. no incentive) and the detection of linguistic manipulations (linguistic manipulations
detected vs. linguistic manipulations not detected) are manipulated across experimental
conditions. The detection of linguistic manipulation (the occurrence of an expectation
violation) is expected to interact with managers’ incentives such that detecting linguistic
manipulations moderates the effect of managers’ incentives on investors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility. More precisely, the effect of managers’ incentives on investors’
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willingness to invest is expected to be weaker when the DA detects linguistic
manipulations than when the DA fails to detect linguistic manipulations.
Four hundred and seventy-two nonprofessional investors participated in this
study. Results show that managers’ incentives and detection of linguistic manipulations
have a significant effect on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and
willingness to invest, but the detection of linguistic manipulation did not moderate the
effect of managers’ incentives on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and their
willingness to invest. The results show that the detection of linguistic manipulations has
the same effect on managers with an incentive to manipulate the tone as on managers
with no incentive to manipulate the tone. While these results fail to provide support for
the interactive effect between linguistic manipulations and managers’ incentives, they
suggest that DAs are an effective tool that can be used by nonprofessional investors to
detect linguistic manipulations.
This study contributes to practice and research. Recently, a significant number of
studies have investigated the effect of linguistics used in corporate narratives on investors
(Courtis, 2004; Li, 2008; Henry, 2008; Feldman et al., 2010; Schleicher and Walker,
2010; Miller, 2010; Roger et al., 2011; Hales et al., 2011; Rennekamp, 2012; Davis et al.
2012; Riley et al., 2014). However, no solutions were presented to mitigate the effect of
linguistics used in cooperate narratives on investors. This study suggests that providing
investors with a DA that is capable of revealing linguistic manipulations can help
investors mitigate the effect of linguistics on their decision making process. Also, this
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study provides evidence that managers’ characteristics such as reporting incentives do not
reduce the effectiveness of such tools.
This study contributes to practice by discouraging managers from using linguistic
manipulations in corporate narratives. Recent evidence from the accounting literature
suggest that managers are less likely to engage in misreporting information if they
believe that investors may be able to see through their behavior (Roger and Stocken,
2005). Once the use of DAs to detect linguistic manipulations becomes common practice
in capital markets, managers should be less incentivized to use such techniques to affect
investors’ decisions.

Background
Recently, corporate narratives, such as the MD&A, have witnessed significant
growth (Francis, 2002; Davis et al., 2012). The growth of narratives in corporate
reporting is a double-edged sword. On one hand, narratives can be used to level the field
between professional and nonprofessional investors. These narratives may provide
nonprofessional investors with an explanation of unfamiliar quantitative information or
may help them extract additional information about a company’s performance. On the
other hand, narratives can be used by managers opportunistically as an impression
management technique to influence decisions (Courtis, 1998; Clatworthy and Jones,
2003; Schleicher and Walker, 2010) and to manage their image (Roger and Stocken,
2005; Craig and Brennan, 2012). Among these manipulations is the strategic use of
certain linguistics such as tone (Henry, 2008; Feldman et al., 2010; Schleicher and
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Walker, 2010; Roger et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2012), readability (Courtis, 2004; Li, 2008;
Rennekamp, 2012), complexity (Miller, 2010), abstractedness and concreteness (Riley et
al., 2014), and vividness and pallidness (Hales et al., 2011).
Deceptive behavior in corporate narratives is difficult to capture because of the
various levels of deception. Managers are more likely to be held accountable for extreme
forms of deception than for more subtle deceptive behavior that is harder to detect. For
example, managers are not necessarily accountable for the tone they use in corporate
narratives. Whether to make managers accountable for the tone they used in corporate
narratives is still under debate in the legal community and so far the court has ruled for
both sides: the investors and the managers (Roger et al., 2011). Changes in tone in
corporate narratives are only one of many forms of linguistic manipulations that
managers can use to mislead investors. The multitude of linguistic techniques that
managers can exhibit to manipulate corporate reports render them more difficult to
detect. Evidence from Roger and Stocken (2005) suggests that managers are less likely to
engage in misreporting information if they believe that investors may be able to see
through their behavior.
The ambiguity of the legal consequences of linguistic manipulations and
managers’ tendency to misreport information to investors (when they can do it without
being detected) creates a significant concern about the impact of managers’ undetected
behavior on investors’ decision making. Managers appear to already use linguistic
features in corporate reports as an impression management technique. Cho et al. (2010)
reports that companies’ use of tone in corporate narratives is related to their
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environmental performance. Companies with bad environmental performance try to
obfuscate their bad performance by using a specific tone. More precisely, companies with
bad environmental performance were systematically more likely to use an optimistic tone
and uncertain tone than companies with better environmental performance. Companies
often use tone in their forward-looking statements by using a positive tone when facing
an impending performance decline (Schleicher and Walker, 2010). Also, Riley et al.
(2014) explore the language category (abstractedness and concreteness) used in press
releases for companies with good and bad financial information and report that
companies with negative (positive) performance are systematically more likely to use
abstract (concrete) language in their press releases.
The evidence above shows that managers take advantage of the regulatory latitude
in reporting qualitative information. Linguistic features in corporate narratives are used to
“sugar coat” reality. Despite the fact that management’s manipulation of linguistics is
very concerning, such a technique might not be an issue if investors can see through it or
are not impacted by a change in linguistics.
Unfortunately, both experimental and archival evidence shows that
nonprofessional investors are influenced by linguistics. Nonprofessional investors’
reactions to disclosures are dependent on disclosure readability (Rennekamp, 2012).
When exposed to more readable disclosures, investors’ valuations judgments are more
positive (negative) when reading good (bad) news. Further, a more readable disclosure
increases investors’ reliance on management disclosure. Investors are more likely to rate
a company favorably and to invest when the press releases’ narratives use concrete
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language as opposed to abstract language (Riley et al., 2014). The vividness of a narrative
can also impact investors’ judgment when the news is inconsistent with investors’
preferences (Hales et al., 2011). The archival accounting literature reports that the market
reacts to the tone used in press releases (Henry, 2008) and MD&A section of annual
reports (Feldman et al., 2010). The more readable the disclosure, the more likely
investors are to engage in trading (Miller, 2010).
Based on the evidence above, investors are influenced by a change in linguistics
in the qualitative portion of annual reports, with nonprofessional investors being the most
influenced. Several accounting studies have documented differences between
professional and nonprofessional investors. Findings from these papers suggest that
professional investors have an “analytical bias” and are more likely to focus on
quantitative information than nonprofessional investors (Hofstedt, 1972; Lee and
Tweedie, 1975). Nonprofessional investors are less familiar with financial statements, use
simpler heuristic models (Maines and McDaniels, 2000), process information
sequentially (Pinsker, 2007), focus on explicitly stated information rather than implicitly
stated information (Krische, 2005; Han and Tan, 2007), and are more likely to include
biased information in their decisions (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007; Mikhail et
al., 2007). The information processing differences between professional and
nonprofessional investor make nonprofessional investors more vulnerable to
management’s linguistic manipulations.
Evidence from the literature also indicates that investors’ reactions to the
linguistics used in annual reports are a result of an unconscious process. Rennekamp

81

(2012) reports that readability impacts investors’ decision making. However, when
investors are aware of the other readability format, they filter out the readability bias 14.
Riley et al. (2014) also suggest that an investor’s bias to linguistic manipulation is an
unconscious process. They asked their participants whether they would have made
different decisions if the press releases did not have narratives in them and whether they
found the narrative sections of the press releases to be informative. Participants’ answers
to these questions across the experimental conditions did not differ. Nevertheless, they
made different decision when they were exposed to more concrete vs. more abstract
language. Similarly, Kelly et al. (2012) argue that nonprofessional investors are not
aware of the optimistic bias in stock recommendations and are more likely to make poor
investment decisions than professional investors (professional investors are more likely to
filter out analysts’ bias). Participants in that study were provided with the distribution of
analysts buy recommendations; merely providing investors with the recommendation
distribution does not work as a debiasing mechanism. However, when a warning message
is added, investors are able to filter out analysts’ bias for their decision making. This
suggests that making nonprofessional investors aware of management’s linguistic
manipulations may work as a debiasing mechanism to improve their decision making
process.

14

Investors who were initially provided with the more readable format corrected their valuation downward
(those who received the less readable disclosure initially did not change their valuation judgment)
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Hypotheses and Theory Development
Linguistic manipulations can be detected via the use of computer programs that
are equipped with algorithms and predefined dictionaries to capture certain linguistics.
These computer programs are DAs that researchers have used to identify the type of
language used by managers in corporate reports. Researchers have used these DAs to
analyze forward looking statements (Schleicher and Walker, 2010), press releases
(Henry, 2008; Riley et al., 2014), and the MD&A (Feldman et al., 2010; Cho et al.,
2010). While not all of the DAs that have been used by researchers are available for sale
by a third party, these DAs can easily be created and investors can easily have access to
them. This study investigates the effect of output from the DA on investors’ decisions.
More precisely, using EVT (Burgoon and Hale, 1988; Burgoon, 1993), this study predicts
the effect of detecting linguistic manipulations in corporate narratives on investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility and their willingness to invest.
Figure 3 below represents the theoretical model for the effect of detecting
linguistic manipulations on investors’ decision making. The model suggests that the
detection of linguistic manipulations interacts with managers’ incentives to affect
investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility, and that the indirect effect of managers’
incentives on investors’ willingness to invest is conditional on whether the output of the
DA detects linguistic manipulations.
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Figure 3: Theoretical Model

84

EVT is a communication theory that describes receivers’ reactions to an
expectancy violation (Burgoon and Hale, 1988; Burgoon, 1993). One central pillar of this
theory is the receiver’s expectancies about the communicator’s behavior or attitude.
Expectancies consist of the receiver’s projection of the communicator’s behavior. These
expectancies can be created from social norms or known idiosyncrasies of the
communicator (Burgoon and Hale, 1988). These norms are derived from factors such as
communicator characteristics, communicator and the receiver relationship, and contextual
factors. These factors define the communicator’s behavior and the communication’s
expectation. When the receiver does not have access to information about the
communicator, expectancies are based on social norms alone (Burgoon and Hale, 1988).
Based on the social norms in an investment setting, managers are expected to
communicate information truthfully. Ex-post to management disclosure, an investor can
confirm or disconfirm the established expectations. When the information communicated
by the manager does not meet an investor’s expectations, the expectations are
disconfirmed and an expectation violation occurs. According to EVT, when a violation
occurs, the receiver determines the sign of the violation. A negative (positive) violation
occurs when a communicator behaves worse (better) than expected. The sign of the
violation has an impact on the communication outcome between the receiver and the
communicator such that a negative (positive) violation results in negative (positive)
communication outcome (Burgoon and Hale, 1988; Burgoon, 1993).
If the receiver detects a negative violation such as a linguistic manipulation, a
negative violation occurs; a manager committed a behavior that did not meet investors’
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expectation. Based on EVT, this violation will have a negative impact on the
communication outcome (Burgoon and Hale, 1988; Burgoon, 1993). In an investment
setting, one of the central outcomes of the communication between managers and
investors is the investors’ willingness to invest in the company. A positive (negative)
communication outcome should encourage (discourage) investors to invest in the
company. Investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility are also an outcome of the
communication between managers and investors. Ex-post to management disclosure,
investors evaluate the characteristics of the disclosure communicated to them and revise
their perceptions of disclosure credibility accordingly (Mercer, 2004). For these reasons,
this study investigates investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and their
willingness to invest as the communication outcome between them and managers.
Investors’ expectations are based on managers’ incentives and thus managers’
incentives have an impact on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility. More
precisely, investors should have lower perceptions of disclosure credibility when
performance is bad than when performance is good. When performance is good,
managers have no incentive to bolster or manipulate the information that they
communicate about their performance. However, when performance is bad, managers
have an incentive to manipulate the information that they communicate about their
performance. As a result, investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility should be lower
for managers with an incentive to manipulate information than for managers with no
incentive to manipulate information.
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Unless investors are able to see through management’s linguistic manipulations,
no expectation violation occurs. As discussed above, investors’ may unconsciously react
to linguistic manipulations and, therefore, may not be able to detect them. However, if
investors have access to a DA that is capable of detecting linguistic manipulations, output
of this DA may create a negative expectation violation when the DA signals the presence
of linguistic manipulations. This negative violation should have a negative impact on the
communication outcomes such that investors are expected to have lower perceptions of
disclosure credibility when the DA signals linguistic manipulation than when the DA
does not signal linguistic manipulation.
When considering the effect of managers’ incentives and the detection of
linguistic manipulations jointly, the effect of managers’ incentives on investors’ decision
making may depend on whether the DA detects linguistic manipulations. EVT argues that
when an expectation violation is not equivocal and its meaning is ambiguous, the
communicator reward valance can alter the effect of the violation on the communication
outcome. The communicator’s reward valence consists of information gathered about the
communicator. Depending on the sign of the gathered information (negative or positive),
a communicator can have a positive or negative reward valence (Burgoon and Hale,
1988; Burgoon, 1993).
In an investment setting, management’s incentives help investors form
management’s reward valence. The detection of linguistic manipulations does not imply
that managers have intentionally used linguistic manipulations. Their behavior may be
unintentional (Clatworthy and Jones, 2006; Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). According
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to EVT, when the violation is ambiguous, the violation is subject to more than one
interpretation and the reward valance influences which interpretation is chosen (Burgoon
and Hale, 1988; Burgoon, 1993). Investors’ interpretation and evaluation of the violation
may not be consistent across managers’ incentives. There are two possible
interpretations. First, managers may have purposely used linguistic manipulations.
Second, managers may have unintentionally used linguistic manipulations. As a result,
detecting linguistic manipulations for managers with no incentive to manipulate the tone
used in corporate reports is more ambiguous than detecting linguistic manipulation for
managers with an incentive to manipulate the tone. The ambiguity of the reasons behind
the linguistic manipulations may impact investors’ decisions such that the effect of
managers’ incentives will be weaker when the DA detects linguistic manipulations than
when the DA fails to detect linguistic manipulations. In other words, the effect of
managers’ incentives on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility is conditional on
whether the DA detects linguistic manipulations.
H1:

Managers’ incentives will have a weaker effect on disclosure credibility
when the DA detects linguistic manipulations than when the DA fails to
detect linguistic manipulations.

Disclosure credibility arguably has a positive effect on investors’ willingness to
invest. While few studies have tested this relationship, findings from the literature
suggest that capital markets react to changes in disclosure credibility (Mishra et al., 2011;
Ng et al., 2013). Market reactions to changes in disclosure credibility indicate that
investors use disclosure credibility to make investment decisions. Findings from
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Krishnamurthy et al. (2006) suggest that such a relationship exists. Krishnamurthy et al.
(2006) explore market reaction to Arthur Anderson’s clients after the audit firm was
accused of obstruction of justice. Their findings show that the market reacted negatively
to Arthur Anderson’s clients. One possible explanation for the negative market reaction
is that investors questioned the credibility of information audited by Arthur Anderson.
Thus, the more (less) investors believe that information reported by managers is credible,
the more (less) they will be willing to invest.
H2:

Disclosure credibility will have a positive effect on investors’ willingness
to invest.

H1 posits that investors have lower perceptions of disclosure credibility when the
DA detects linguistic manipulations for managers with an incentive to manipulate the
tone than when the DA detects linguistic manipulation for managers with no incentive to
manipulate the tone. H2 posits that investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility will
have an effect on investors’ willingness to invest. Further, managers’ incentives should
affect investors’ decisions such as their willingness to invest. Therefore, managers’
incentives may have a direct effect on investors’ willingness to invest but may also have
an indirect effect through their perceptions of disclosure credibility. Investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility may mediate the effect of managers’ incentives on
investors’ willingness to invest. Based on H1, the detection of linguistic manipulations
interacts with managers’ incentives to affect investors’ perceptions of disclosure
credibility. Thus, the indirect effect of managers’ incentives on investors’ willingness to
invest also depends on whether the DA detects linguistic manipulations. The indirect
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effect of managers’ incentives on investors’ willingness to invest will be stronger when
the DA fails to detect linguistic manipulations than when the DA detects linguistic
manipulations.
H3:

The effect of managers’ incentives on investors’ willingness to invest
through disclosure credibility will be stronger when the DA fails to detect
linguistic manipulations than when it detects linguistic manipulations.

Methods
Design
The above hypotheses are tested using a 2X2 experiment with the output of the
DA (linguistic manipulations detected vs. linguistic manipulations not detected) and
managers’ incentives (incentive vs. no incentive) as the independent variables. All
participants were provided with the same “environmental matters” section of a
company’s MD&A. Managers’ incentive is manipulated by contrasting the information in
the MD&A section to information from a business journal. In the incentive condition, the
business journal describes the company as a bad environmental performer. In the no
incentive condition, the business journal describes the company as a good environmental
performer. To manipulate linguistic manipulation detection, participants receive a brief
description of the DA and its output. The description explains that the content from the
MD&A has been analyzed using the DA and the report generated indicates whether tone
is manipulated in the MD&A. In the undetected linguistic manipulations condition,
participants receive a report stating that “The analyzed narrative is free from tone
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manipulations”. In the detected linguistic manipulations condition, participants receive a
report stating that “The analyzed narrative is NOT free from tone manipulations”.

Procedures
Across all experimental conditions, participants are told that they have
accumulated $50,000 dollars of personal savings and that they have decided to invest
$10,000 dollars of their savings by purchasing a company’s stock. Then, they are
presented with experimental materials that describe Chocolato, Inc. as a medium-sized
confectionery manufacturer and retail operator led by Chief Executive Officer, Dan
Johnson. 15 Once introduced to Chocolato, participants have access to a consensus
analysts’ forecast that reflects growth in Chocolato’s revenue. Then, participants are
provided with the business journal article that described Chocolato’s environmental
performance positively in the no incentive condition and negatively in the incentive
condition. Participants are provided with the income statement information and the
“environmental matters” discussion from the MD&A section of Chocolato’s annual
report16.
After reading the company information, participants are then presented with a
description of a software tool (the DA) that detects linguistic manipulations, which is
capable of detecting tone manipulations in the MD&A. More precisely, they are
presented with the output of the DA which indicates whether the MD&A was free from
linguistic manipulations. The focus is on the MD&A section of the annual report for three

15
16

The experimental materials were adapted from Elliott et al. (2012).
Part of the MD&A section was adapted from the MD&A examples reported in Cho et al. (2010).

91

reasons. First, research suggests that linguistic manipulations impact nonprofessional
investors’ more than professional investors and that nonprofessional investors have a
preference for information in the MD&A (Hodge and Pronk, 2006; Arnold et al., 2010).
Second, the lack of regulatory monitoring of information reported in the MD&A provides
more room for managers to manage investors’ impressions. Third, research suggests that
tone manipulations are being used in the MD&A section and are impacting investors’
decisions (Feldman et al., 2010). After reading the experimental materials, participants
are asked to answer a series of questions about the variables of interest and provide
demographic information.

Measured Variables
To measure investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility, participants answer
five questions anchored from strongly disagree to strongly agree on a seven point likert
scale. These questions were taken from the message credibility literature (Chesney and
Su, 2010; Flanagin and Metzger, 2007, 2003, 2000) and capture participants’ beliefs
about whether the information reported in the MD&A section is believable, accurate,
trustworthy, unbiased, and complete. Participants’ willingness to invest is measured by
the dollar amount that they chose to invest in Chocolato (from $0 to $10,000).

Control Variables
Three control variables were added to the analyses: investors’ reliance on the DA,
investors’ financial literacy, and investors’ environmental beliefs. Evidence from the
literature suggest that investors’ financial literacy impacts their judgment and decision
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making (Hilgert et al., 2003; Lusardi, 2008; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; Hung et al.,
2009; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011; Van Rooij et al., 2011). Financial literacy consists of
investors’ knowledge about basic financial concepts. Investors’ perceptions of disclosure
credibility and their willingness to invest may be driven by their understanding of these
financial concepts; therefore, this measure is included in the overall model. To measure
investors’ financial literacy, five questions were adapted from the Financial Industry
Regulation Authority’s (FINRA) national survey (FINRA, 2009a; FINRA, 2009b;
FINRA, 2012). Scores on this measure range from “zero” (low financial literacy” to
“five” (high financial literacy).
Evidence from the literature also suggests that investors’ decisions may be driven
by their reliance on the DA (e.g., Triki and Weisner, forthcoming). Reliance is “…the
degree to which the user of a DA applies the aid and incorporates the recommendations
of the aid during judgment formulation…” (Arnold and Sutton, 1998 pg. 180). To control
for the effect of DA reliance, a slightly modified version of Hampton’s (2005) items was
used. Participants were provided with seven items and the responses ranged from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” on a seven point likert scale.
As discussed above, managers’ incentive was manipulated by contrasting the
information in the MD&A section to the information in the business journal describing
Chocolato’s environmental performance. Some participants’ decisions may be solely
driven by their environmental beliefs and not by whether managers had incentive to
manipulate the information in the MD&A. To isolate the effect of investors’
environmental beliefs, Dunlap et al. (2000)’s New Ecological Paradigm Scale (NEPS)
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which measures individuals’ environmental beliefs was used. Participants were presented
with fifteen items and the responses ranged from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”
on a seven point likert scale.

Participants
Nonprofessional investors were reached through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Four
hundred and seventy-two responses were collected and used to analyze the data17. To
limit the pool of participants to individuals with some investing experience, the study
included three screening questions as follows:
1. Have you ever made personal investments in the common stock of a
company?
2. Approximately, how many years of personal investment experience do you
have?
3. Approximately, how many times have you purchased common stock of a

company as a personal investment?
On average, participants spent 19.66 minutes of their time completing the
experimental task. Participants were paid $3 for successfully completing the task
resulting in an average hourly wage of $9.16. Participants were 57% male, 43% female,

17

Five hundred eleven participants completed the instrument, but, some responses shared the same IP
address and some responses had missing data. After deleting these responses, 482 responses remained. The
analysis of variance revealed that the variance was unequal across the four cells. To meet the assumption of
the ANOVA analysis, either the cell size condition or the equal variance condition has to be met (Glass et
al., 1972). Since the equal variance assumption was not supported, some observations were excluded from
the analyses. A random number generator was used to equalize the cell sizes across all experimental
conditions (Lyubimov et al. 2013). After equalizing cell sizes, 472 responses remained (118 observations
per cell size).
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90.7% used financial statements to evaluate a company’s performance, 72.2% had
business work experience, 19.5% had work experience in financial analyses, and 91.5%
plan to invest in the future. Participants with business (financial analysis) work
experience had average experience of 10.93 (5.23) years. On average, participants have
taken 2.01 accounting courses and 1.81 finance courses. Results from the financial
literacy measures indicate that 44.3% of participants had a perfect scores and 37.9%
answered 4 question out of five correctly.
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Table 8: Demographic Information
Mean
Average number of years of investing experience
Average number of times making purchases of common stock
Average number of accounting classes taken
Average number of finance classes taken
Gender
Male
Female
Age
18 - 20 years
21 - 25 years
26 - 29 years
30 - 39 years
40 - 49 years
50 - 59 years
60 – 69 years
>69
Prefer Not to Answer
Ethnicity
Asian
African American
Hispanic
Native American
Caucasian
Others
Prefer Not to Answer
Education
Less than high school
High School/ GED
Some College
2-year college degree
Undergraduate degree
Master degree
Doctoral degree
Used Financial Statements to Evaluate Company Performance
Yes
No
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7.09
17.31
2.01
1.81

Standard
Deviation
7.02
26.28
2.95
2.84

Number

Percent

269
203

57.0%
43.0%

7
63
72
171
87
50
20
1
1

1.5%
13.3%
15.3%
36.2%
18.4%
10.6%
4.2%
0.2%
0.2%

32
33
23
9
369
4
2

6.8%
7.0%
4.9%
1.9%
78.2%
0.8%
0.4%

1
37
99
56
200
68
11

0.2%
7.8%
21.0%
11.9%
42.4%
14.4%
2.3%

428
44

90.7%
9.3%

Business Work Experience (Average is 10.93 years)
Yes
No
Work Experience in financial analysis (Average is 5.23 years)
Yes
No
Plan to Invest in Common Stock in Future
Yes
No
Financial Literacy Scores (Average is 4.19)
Participants who had five correct answers
Participants who had four correct answers
Participants who had three correct answers
Participants who had two correct answers
Participants who had one correct answers
Participants who had no correct answers

Number

Percent

341
131

72.2%
27.8%

92
380

19.5%
80.5%

432
40

91.5%
8.5%

209
179
57
20
6
1

44.3%
37.9%
12.1%
4.2%
1.3%
0.2%

Results
In order to explore the factor structure of Dunlap et al. (2000)’s measure of
environmental beliefs, an unrotated principal component analysis was conducted. Table 9
Panel A results show that three components emerged. An examination of the component
structure suggests that three items (Environmental Beliefs 6, 9, and 14) loaded on more
than one component. These items were deleted to obtain a one component solution shown
in Panel B. The same analysis was conducted for the DA reliance and disclosure
credibility measures. All disclosure credibility items loaded on one common component
(Panel C); and, except for one item, all of the DA reliance items loaded on one
component (Panel D). The DA reliance item that did not load was excluded from the
analyses to obtain a one component solution (Panel E).
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Table 9: Measurement Validation
Panel A: Principal Component Analysis for Environmental Belief

Environmental Belief 1: We are approaching the limit of the number
of people the earth can support.
Environmental Belief 2 (Reverse Coded): Humans have the right to
modify the natural environment to suit their needs.
Environmental Belief 3: When humans interfere with nature it often
produces disastrous consequences.
Environmental Belief 4 (Reverse Coded): Human ingenuity will
insure that we do NOT make the earth unlivable.
Environmental Belief 5: Humans are severely abusing the
environment.
Environmental Belief 6 (Reverse Coded): The earth has plenty of
natural resources if we just learn how to develop them.
Environmental Belief 7: Plants and animals have as much right as
humans to exist.
Environmental Belief 8 (Reverse Coded): The balance of nature is
strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.
Environmental Belief 9: Despite our special abilities humans are still
subject to the laws of nature.
Environmental Belief 10 (Reverse Coded): The so-called “Ecological
crisis” facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated.
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1

Components
2

3

.656

.082

-.490

.705

.120

.292

.789

-.024

-.018

.665

.415

.102

.817

-.285

-.114

.574

.514

-.174

.579

-.409

.207

.808

.093

.031

.370

-.376

.543

.782

-.142

-.030

Environmental Belief 11: The earth is like a spaceship with very
limited room and resources
Environmental Belief 12 (Reverse Coded): Humans were meant to
rule over the rest of nature.
Environmental Belief 13: The balance of nature is very delicate and
easily upset
Environmental Belief 14 (Reverse Coded): Humans will eventually
learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it.
Environmental Belief 15: If things continue on their present course,
we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
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1

Components
2

3

.735

.026

-.348

.594

-.018

.254

.757

-.157

-.054

.489

.556

.467

.817

-.253

-.184

Panel B: One Component Solution for Environmental Beliefs
Component
Environmental Belief 1: We are approaching the limit of the number of people
the earth can support.
Environmental Belief 2 (Reverse Coded): Humans have the right to modify the
natural environment to suit their needs.
Environmental Belief 3: When humans interfere with nature it often produces
disastrous consequences.
Environmental Belief 4 (Reverse Coded): Human ingenuity will insure that we
do NOT make the earth unlivable.
Environmental Belief 5: Humans are severely abusing the environment.
Environmental Belief 7: Plants and animals have as much right as humans to
exist.
Environmental Belief 8 (Reverse Coded): The balance of nature is strong
enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.
Environmental Belief 10 (Reverse Coded): The so-called “Ecological crisis”
facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated.
Environmental Belief 11: The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room
and resources
Environmental Belief 12 (Reverse Coded): Humans were meant to rule over the
rest of nature.
Environmental Belief 13: The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset
Environmental Belief 15: If things continue on their present course, we will
soon experience a major ecological catastrophe.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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.665
.695
.794
.640
.841
.594
.801
.789
.738
.597
.765
.836

Panel C: Principal Component Analysis for Disclosure Credibility
Component
Disclosure credibility 1: The information reported in the MD&A section is
believable.
Disclosure credibility 2: The information reported in the MD&A section is
accurate.
Disclosure credibility 3: The information reported in the MD&A section is
trustworthy
Disclosure credibility 4: The information reported in the MD&A section is
unbiased
Disclosure credibility 5: The information reported in the MD&A section is
complete.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
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.934
.938
.943
.811
.829

Panel D: Principal Component Analysis for Reliance
Components
Reliance 1: I agree with the results of the results of the tone
analysis software.
Reliance 2: I have confidence in the result of the results of the
tone analysis software
Reliance 3 (reverse coded): I can detect tone manipulation
without the tone analysis software.
Reliance 4: I incorporated the tone analysis software’s results
into my decisions
Reliance 5: I relied on the results of the tone analysis software
Reliance 6: I believe that the tone analysis software is capable
of detecting tone manipulations
Reliance 7: The results of the tone analysis software are
convincing.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
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1

2

.817

-.248

.894

-.121

.154

.942

.821

.146

.817

.238

.849

-.108

.910

-.063

Panel E: Principal Component Analysis for Reliance
Reliance 1: I agree with the results of the results of the tone analysis software.
Reliance 2: I have confidence in the result of the results of the tone analysis
software
Reliance 4: I incorporated the tone analysis software’s results into my decisions
Reliance 5: I relied on the results of the tone analysis software
Reliance 6: I believe that the tone analysis software is capable of detecting tone
manipulations
Reliance 7: The results of the tone analysis software are convincing.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
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Component
.822
.896
.819
.812
.851
.911

To explore the discriminant and convergent validity of all three measures, all the
items that generated a one component solution were analyzed together using a Promax
rotation. The results show that all items loaded on their respective components.
Nevertheless, the measure for environmental beliefs did not reach an acceptable level of
average variance extracted (AVE). Untabulated results showed that the AVE for the
environmental beliefs measure was (.49) which is inferior to the cutoff value of .50. As a
result, an additional item (Environmental Beliefs 7), which had the lowest loading in the
analysis, was deleted from the environmental beliefs measure to reach an acceptable
AVE. The list of items included in the analyses is reported in Table 10 Panel A. The
results suggest that after deleting this additional item, all measures have an acceptable
AVE as well as acceptable convergent validity for all measures. The measures’
discriminate validity was also assessed by checking whether the square root of the AVE
was higher than the interconstruct correlations. Results suggest that all interconstruct
correlations are less than the square root of the measures’ AVEs indicating an acceptable
discriminate validity (Panel B). Also, all three measures had a composite reliability
higher than .90 indicating that all measures had acceptable internal reliability. Results
from these analyses suggest that these measures have acceptable psychometric properties.
Participants’ average response on the items for each construct was used to measure
participants’ environmental beliefs, DA reliance, and perceptions of disclosure
credibility.
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Table 10: Principal Component Analysis and Psychometric Properties
Panel A: Principal Component Analysis (with Promax Rotation)
Components
1
2
3
Environmental Belief 1: We are approaching the limit of the number of people the
earth can support.
Environmental Belief 2 (Reverse Coded): Humans have the right to modify the
natural environment to suit their needs.
Environmental Belief 3: When humans interfere with nature it often produces
disastrous consequences.
Environmental Belief 4 (Reverse Coded): Human ingenuity will insure that we do
NOT make the earth unlivable.
Environmental Belief 5: Humans are severely abusing the environment.
Environmental Belief 8 (Reverse Coded): The balance of nature is strong enough to
cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.
Environmental Belief 10 (Reverse Coded): The so-called “Ecological crisis” facing
humankind has been greatly exaggerated.
Environmental Belief 11: The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and
resources
Environmental Belief 12 (Reverse Coded): Humans were meant to rule over the
rest of nature.
Environmental Belief 13: The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset
Environmental Belief 15: If things continue on their present course, we will soon
experience a major ecological catastrophe.
Reliance 1: I agree with the results of the results of the tone analysis software.
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.672

.066

-.006

.690

.096

-.090

.797

.066

-.032

.648

.003

-.029

.840

.070

-.041

.812

-.012

-.086

.791

.070

-.085

.746

.021

-.029

.588

-.012

-.057

.764

.129

-.005

.837

.115

.044

-.008

.823

.081

Components
1
2
3
Reliance 2: I have confidence in the result of the results of the tone analysis
software
Reliance 4: I incorporated the tone analysis software’s results into my decisions
Reliance 5: I relied on the results of the tone analysis software
Reliance 6: I believe that the tone analysis software is capable of detecting tone
manipulations
Reliance 7: The results of the tone analysis software are convincing.
Disclosure credibility 1: The information reported in the MD&A section is
believable.
Disclosure credibility 2: The information reported in the MD&A section is
accurate.
Disclosure credibility 3: The information reported in the MD&A section is
trustworthy
Disclosure credibility 4: The information reported in the MD&A section is
unbiased
Disclosure credibility 5: The information reported in the MD&A section is
complete.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
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.066

.896

.167

.066
.062

.818
.811

.183
.205

.070

.850

.173

.118

.912

.165

-.064

.139

.934

-.083

.154

.937

-.089

.152

.943

.036

.178

.812

-.020

.228

.826

Panel B: Analyses for Discriminant and Convergent Validity
Average
Composite
Variance
Environmental
Reliability
Extracted
Belief
Environmental
0.920
0.517
0.719
Belief
Disclosure
0.936
0.749
-0.070
Credibility
0.925
0.673
0.093
DA Reliance

Disclosure
Credibility

Bolded values on the diagonals indicate the square root of the Average Extracted Variance (AVE).
Italicized values represent interconstruct correlations
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DA Reliance

0.866
0.172

0.821

In order to verify that participants perceived that bad environmental performers
have more incentive to change the language used in the MD&A section than good
environmental performers, participants were asked to provide their agreement about the
manager’s incentives to manipulate the tone used in the MD&A. Answers on this item
ranged from strongly disagree (indicating no incentive) to strongly agree (indicating
incentive). Untabulated results show that the mean response on this question was
significantly higher (p < 0.001) for participants in the bad environmental performance
condition (mean = 5.48; standard deviation = 1.41) than for participants in the good
environmental performance condition (mean = 4.50; standard deviation = 1.64). These
results suggest that the manipulation of managers’ incentives was successful and that
participants understood managerial reporting incentives.
The descriptive statistics which are shown in Table 11, Panel A, indicate that
participants had higher perceptions of disclosure credibility when managers had no
incentive to manipulate the language used in the MD&A (mean = 4.87; standard
deviation = 1.07) than when managers had an incentive to manipulate the language used
in the MD&A (mean = 3.70; standard deviation = 1.43). Participants had lower
perceptions of disclosure credibility when the DA detected linguistic manipulation (mean
= 3.73; standard deviation = 1.31) than when the DA failed to detect linguistic
manipulations (mean = 4.84; standard deviation = 1.25).
To test H1, an ANCOVA analysis was conducted with managers’ incentives
(incentive vs. no incentive) and DA Output (tone manipulation not detected vs. tone
manipulation detected) as the independent variables, and investors’ perceptions of
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disclosure credibility as the dependent variable. The control variables included in the
ANCOVA analysis are investors’ reliance on the DA, financial literacy, environmental
beliefs, and highest level of education18. Results from the ANCOVA analysis, shown in
Panel B, indicate that the company’s environmental performance had a significant effect
on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility such that investors in the incentive
condition rated disclosure credibility significantly lower (p < 0.001) than investors in the
no incentive condition. The results also suggest that the detection of tone manipulations
had a significant effect on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility such that
investors rated management’s disclosure credibility to be significantly lower (p < 0.001)
when the DA detected tone manipulations than when the DA failed to detect tone
manipulations. While the results suggest that the DA output and managers’ incentives
have a main effect on investor’ perceptions of disclosure credibility, the results fail to
provide support for the interactive effect predicted in H1. Results from the ANCOVA
analysis suggest that the interaction between DA output and managers’ incentives is not
statistically significant (p = 0.232). The results suggest that the effect of managers’
incentives on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility is not moderated by the
detection of tone manipulation. Therefore, H1 is not supported.

Untabulated results show that participants’ demographic information do not differ significantly across the
experimental conditions and that participants’ highest level of education had a significant relationship with
their perceptions of disclosure credibility and their willingness to invest. To account for the effect of
education on the dependent variables, education was added as a control variable.
18
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Table 11: Disclosure Credibility
Panel A: Disclosure Credibility – Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]
Managers’ Incentive
Incentive
No Incentive
DA Output
4.22
5.45
Undetected Tone
(1.33)
(0.78)
Manipulations
[118]
[118]
3.17
4.30
Detected Tone
(1.34)
(1.01)
Manipulations
[118]
[118]
3.70
4.87
Average
(1.43)
(1.07)
[118]
[118]
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Average
4.84
(1.25)
[236]
3.73
(1.31)
[236]
[472]

Panel B: ANCOVA Model of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable = Disclosure
Credibility)
Source
S.S
d.f.
M.S.
F-Ratio
p-value*
140.762
1
140.762
114.634
<0.001
Managers’ Incentive
143.282
1
143.282
116.686
<0.001
DA Output
Managers’ Incentive * DA
0.657
1
0.657
0.535
0.232
Output
Covariates:
1.683
1
1.683
1.371
Financial Literacy
0.121
6.093
1
6.093
4.962
Education
0.013
Environmental Beliefs
2.779
1
2.779
2.263
0.067
DA Reliance
20.399
1
20.399
16.612
<0.001
569.758
464
1.228
Error
9581.320
472
Total
*All p-values are one-tailed
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A mediation analysis was conducted to test the mediating role of disclosure
credibility and to test H2. The mediation analysis was conducted by using PROCESS
(Hayes, 2013). The results of this analysis are shown in Table 12. In the mediation
analysis, investors’ willingness to invest was set as the outcome variable, managers’
incentives was set as the predictor, and disclosure credibility was set as the mediator.
Also, investors’ education, financial literacy, and environmental beliefs were added as
control variables. Results from the mediation analysis show that disclosure credibility has
a significant effect (p < 0.001) on investors’ willingness to invest. Therefore, H2 is
supported. The results also show that disclosure credibility mediates the effect of
managers’ incentives on investors’ willingness to invest (Bootstrapped lower level
confidence interval = 632.768; Bootstrapped upper level confidence interval = 1069.455).
H3 predicts a moderated mediation. The results from testing H1 do not support
the predicted moderation; as a result, a moderated mediation cannot be tested. Thus, the
results also fail to support H3.
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Table 12: Mediation Analysis of Managers’ Incentive on Investors’ Willingness to Invest
Panel A: Direct Effect of Managers’ Incentive on Investors Willingness to Invest

(Constant)
Predictor:
Managers’ Incentive
Mediator:
Disclosure
Credibility
Covariates:
Financial Literacy
Environmental
Beliefs
Education

Coefficient

SE

t

Sig.
(One-tailed)

LLCI

ULCI

619.087

836.087

0.741

0.230

-758.893

1997.066

524.752

229.194

2.29

0.011

147.011

902.493

736.423

83.484

8.821

<0.001

598.831

874.016

-6.086

116.707

-0.052

0.479

-198.434

186.262

-140.729
-140.5

85.976
85.902

-1.637
-1.636

0.051
0.052

-282.427
-282.078

0.97
1.078

Panel B: Indirect Effect of Managers’ Incentive on Investors Willingness to Invest
Bootstrapped Bootstrapped
Mediator
Effect
Boot SE
LLCI
ULCI
Disclosure Credibility
836.491
132.227
632.768
1069.455
LLCI: Lower level confidence interval
ULCI: Upper level confidence interval
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Supplemental Analyses
To test H1, investors’ perception of disclosure credibility was used as the
dependent variable in the ANCOVA analysis. To investigate the effect of DA output and
managers’ incentives on investors’ willingness to invest, the same ANCOVA analysis
was conducted with investors’ willingness to invest as the dependent variable. The results
show that managers’ incentives and the detection of tone manipulations have a significant
effect on investors’ willingness to invest (p < 0.001 and p = 0.022 respectively), and that
the detection of tone manipulation did not moderate the effect of managers’ incentives on
investors’ willingness to invest (p = 0.471). Results are reported in Table 13.
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Table 13: Investors’ Willingness to Invest
Panel A: Investors’ Willingness to Invest – Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]
Managers’ Incentive
Incentive
No Incentive
Average
DA Output
$3,126.09
$4,744.06
$3,935.08
Undetected Tone
($2,235.493)
($2,426.12)
($2,464.92)
Manipulations
[118]
[118]
[236]
$2,871.64
$4,098.52
$3,485.08
Detected Tone
($2,609.36)
($2,516.97)
($2,630.95)
Manipulations
[118]
[118]
[236]
$2,998.87
$4,421.29
Average
($2,427.80)
($2,487.81)
[472]
[118]
[118]
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Panel B: ANCOVA Model of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable = Investors’
Willingness to Invest)
Source
S.S
d.f.
M.S.
F-Ratio
p-value*
200978881.054
1
200978881.054
34.407
<0.001
Managers’ Incentive
23767320.127
1
23767320.127
4.069
0.022
DA Output
Managers’ Incentive * DA
31649.059
1
31649.059
0.005
0.471
Output
Covariates:
805373.708
1
805373.708
0.138
0.355
Financial Literacy
26921295.404
1
26921295.404
4.609
0.016
Education
Environmental Beliefs
25498455.185
1
25498455.185
4.365
0.019
DA Reliance
32322512.754
1
32322512.754
5.534
0.010
2710290532.317
464
5841143.389
Error
9575280269.000
472
Total
*All p-values are one-tailed
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Summary of Findings
Results from the ANCOVA analyses show that investors in the incentive condition
had a significantly lower perception of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest
than investors in the no incentive condition. These results suggest that investors
understand managerial reporting incentives and that investors had a lower perception of
disclosure credibility when managers had an incentive to manipulate the language used in
the MD&A than when managers did not have an incentive to manipulate the language
used in the MD&A. Detecting tone manipulations also had a significant effect on
investors’ perception of disclosure credibility and on their willingness to invest. Investors
had significantly lower perceptions of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest
when the DA detected tone manipulations than when the DA failed to detect tone
manipulations.
The interaction between managers’ incentives and the detection of tone
manipulations predicted in H1 was not statistically significant. The effect of managers’
incentives on investors’ perception of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest did
not depend on whether the DA detected tone manipulations. These results suggest that
despite investors’ understanding of managers’ incentives to manipulate the tone when
they are bad environmental performers, tone detection did not moderate the effect of
managers’ incentives on investors’ perception of disclosure credibility and their
willingness to invest. The results also suggest that investors’ perceptions of disclosure
credibility hav a positive effect on investors’ willingness to invest. Thus, H2 was
supported. While the results show that investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility
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mediates the effect of managers’ incentives on investors’ willingness to invest, they do
not support the moderated mediation predicted in H3. The moderated mediation could not
be tested without providing support for H1.

Conclusions
Findings from this study suggest that nonprofessional investors understand
managers’ reporting incentives and that investors’ revise their perceptions of disclosure
credibility and willingness to invest according to these incentives. Investors’ perception
of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest is lower when managers have an
incentive to obfuscate their environmental performance. Also, the use of a tone detection
DA had a significant impact on investors’ perception of disclosure credibility and their
willingness to invest such that investors’ perception of disclosure credibility and their
willingness to invest was lower when the DA detected tone manipulations that when the
DA did not detect tone manipulations.
This study argued that the effect of managers’ incentives on investors’ willingness
to invest is conditional on whether the DA detects linguistic manipulations. More
precisely, using EVT, this study argued that managers’ incentives have a weaker effect
on investors’ willingness to invest when the DA detects linguistic manipulations than
when the DA fails to detect linguistic manipulations. Results from this study show that
detecting linguistic manipulation does not moderate the effect of managers’ incentive on
investors’ willingness to invest. As a result, the results of this study do not support the
predictions of the theoretical model advanced in this study.
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Based on EVT, when the expectation violation is not equivocal and its meaning is
ambiguous, investors’ understanding of managers’ incentives can reduce the effect of the
violation. Detecting linguistic manipulations does not imply that managers have
intentionally used linguistic manipulations. The argument made in this paper was that
detecting linguistic manipulations for managers with no incentive to manipulate the
language in the MD&A was more ambiguous than detecting linguistic manipulations for
managers with an incentive to manipulate the language. The ambiguity may be the result
of investors’ inference of whether managers used linguistic manipulations intentionally.
The results from this study suggest that investors do not distinguish between intentional
and unintentional linguistic manipulations. When the DA detects linguistic
manipulations, investors infer that managers’ behavior is intentional. Overall, findings
from this study show that tone detection software impacts investors’ judgments and
decision making and that, regardless of managers’ incentives, the detection of tone
manipulations has a negative effect on investors’ perception disclosure credibility. As a
result, findings from this study provide support for using tone detection DAs as a tool to
detect linguistic manipulations in corporate reports.
While this study provides insight into the effect of detecting linguistic
manipulations on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and their willingness to
invest, several questions remain unanswered. The DA used in this study operationalized
linguistic manipulations by informing participants that the analyzed narrative was not
free from tone manipulations. Nevertheless, tone is one of many types of linguistic
manipulations. Future research should investigate whether the type of linguistic
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manipulations detected has a different effect on nonprofessional investors’ decision
making. For example, does a DA that detects optimism in corporate reports have a similar
effect on investors’ judgment and decision making as a DA that detects certainty? Also,
linguistic manipulations were detected in the MD&A section of the annual report, which
is reviewed by the external auditor. The effect of detecting linguistic manipulations may
not have a similar effect if the linguistic manipulations were detected in a report that is
not subject to a review by external auditors. Future research should explore whether the
location of language manipulations matters.
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STUDY 3
THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON NONPROFESSIONAL
INVESTORS’ DECISION MAKING
A fundamental observation about human society is that people who communicate
regularly with one another think similarly. There is at any place and in any time a
Zeitgeist, a spirit of the times…Word-of-mouth transmission of ideas appears to be an
important contributor to day-to-day or hour-to-hour stock market fluctuations (Shiller,
2000 pg. 148, 155).

Introduction
In capital markets, information about a company is asymmetrically available for
managers and investors. Contrary to managers, investors do not have full access to
information. To compensate for information asymmetry, investors can seek additional
information from other sources. One of these sources is information received from other
individuals with whom they interact. Research suggests that investors seek and include
information received from these individuals in their decision making process (Shiller and
Pound, 1989; Kelly and O’Grada, 2000; Hong et al., 2005; Ivkovic and Weisbenner,
2007). This information takes the form of word-of-mouth where investors exchange their
opinions and views.
Technological advancements have boosted the interconnectedness between
individuals and created new social media outlets where individual investors can easily
access each other’s opinions about a specific topic. Traditional word-of-mouth is now
transformed to an electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM19) where investors can receive

Electronic word-of-mouth is defined as “…any positive or negative statement made by potential, actual,
or former customers about a product or company, which is made available to a multitude of people and
institutions via the Internet” (Hennig-Thrau et al., 2004 pg. 39).
19
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word-of-mouth information, not only from individuals with whom they interact, but also
from unknown individuals with whom they have never previously interacted. In other
words, the communication form between investors has morphed to include both face-toface communication and computer-mediated communication (CMC). eWOM can be
found in numerous social media outlets such as blogs, forums, YouTube videos,
Facebook, Twitter, etc. This study focuses on eWOM about management disclosure.
When management communicates information to capital markets, any individual is free
to share his or her beliefs and opinions about these disclosures. For example, an
individual may believe that the information communicated by management is misleading
and share those beliefs with others via CMC. This information may not necessarily be
reliable, but can be readily available to anyone who reads social media posts. Anyone,
whether expert in certain matters or not, can post comments on various social media sites.
Forums are one of the many social media outlets that investors can access. Information in
forums is generated and used by a group of individuals (hereafter referred to as
bloggers20) who can freely share their views and opinions about a certain topic. When
investors include information in their decision making process, the quality of their
investment decisions becomes dependent on the quality of information that they have
received and the weight allocated to that information (O’ Conner, 2013). The purpose of
this study is to investigate whether eWOM from social media has an influence on
investors’ decision making and how eWOM influences their decision making.

20

The term bloggers is used to refer to “forum users”.
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Spears and Lea’s (1992) “social identification of the de-individuation effect”
model (SIDE) suggests that the influence of eWOM is a function of an individual’s social
identity. Specifically, SIDE suggests that eWOM will have a stronger influence on
investors who identify themselves with a group of bloggers (high social identification)
than investors who do not identify themselves with a group of bloggers (low social
identification). SIDE also suggests that the degree of visual anonymity in social media
affects the influence of eWOM on investors and that the effect of visual anonymity on the
influence of eWOM is conditional on whether investors’ identify themselves with a group
of bloggers. Based on SIDE, this study predicts that investors’ decisions are more (less)
influenced by eWOM when they have high (low) social identification. Also, investors
with low social identification are more influenced by eWOM when they view bloggers’
comments via video than when they read bloggers’ comments in text form; investors
with high social identification are more influenced by eWOM when they read bloggers’
text comments than when they view bloggers’ video comments.
To test the theorized relationships, a 2X2 experiment is conducted. Social
identification (high social identification vs. low social identification) and visual
anonymity (text comments vs. video comments) are manipulated, and investors’
perception of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest are the dependent variables.
Participants receive information on a hypothetical company whose CEO announced an
earnings’ restatement. After the announcement, participants are provided with
hypothetical bloggers’ comments criticizing the credibility of the CEO’s explanation for
the earnings’ restatement and stating that the stock of this company was not a good
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investment. Visual anonymity is manipulated by changing the format of bloggers’
comments. Visual anonymity is ensured by providing participants with text comments
and is compromised by providing participants with video comments. When participants
read bloggers’ text comments, they have no access to information about the bloggers. On
the other hand, when participants view bloggers’ video comments, they have access to
information about the bloggers. Social identification is manipulated by informing
participants whether they are members of and have previously participated in the forum.
After receiving bloggers’ comments, participants are asked to provide their perceptions of
disclosure credibility and willingness to invest.
Results from this research suggest that bloggers’ comments have a stronger
influence on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility when investors have high
social identification than when investors have low social identification. Also, bloggers’
comments have an influence on investors’ willingness to invest such that investors with
low social identification are more influenced when they read text comments than when
they view video comments, and investors with high social identification are more
influenced when they view video comments than when they read text comments. While
findings from this study provide support for the moderating role of social identification,
the relationship is in the opposite direction than the direction predicted by SIDE. Thus,
results from this study fail to support the SIDE model.
This study contributes to the literature by answering the call for more research on
investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility (Mercer, 2004) and by providing
additional evidence on the effect of disclosure credibility on investors’ willingness to
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invest. This study also benefits regulators as it provides evidence that individual investors
include information available in unregulated social media in their decision making model.
This evidence raises concerns on whether to regulate the information in social media. For
example, lawmakers can make individuals more accountable for spreading rumors that
affect capital markets. This study also provides insights for future research. Future
research can investigate de-biasing mechanisms that nonprofessional investors can use to
mitigate the influence of information retrieved in unregulated social media outlets.
This study also provides theoretical insights into the effect of social identification
and visual anonymity on investors’ decision making. More precisely, while this study
fails to provide support for the SIDE model, it supports the role of social identification in
computer mediated communication. Moreover, the results of this study suggest that the
directionality of the theoretical predictions made by SIDE may not accurately describe
the effect of visual anonymity and social identification on individuals’ decision making.
These findings suggest that more theoretical work and research on the effect of social
media is needed.

Background
Investors are not isolated from other investors and other individuals available in
their environment. Investors are part of society and subject to interpersonal
communication with other individuals who participate in financial markets or have an
opinion to share about investment opportunities or threats. Evidence in the literature
suggests that investors are incapable of separating themselves from other individuals in
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their environment and include information received from these individuals in their
decision making process (Shiller and Pound, 1989; Kelly and O’Grada, 2000; Hong et al.,
2005; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2007).
Financial markets have two types of constituents: professional and
nonprofessional investors. One of the main differences between these two groups of
investors is the level of training and understanding of financial information.
Nonprofessional investors use more simplistic heuristics to analyze financial statements
and are more exposed to falling into bad investment decisions than professional investors.
Nevertheless, the literature shows that neither professional nor nonprofessional investors
are immune to the influence of other individuals in their environment. Evidence from
Hong et al. (2005) shows that fund managers may make their investment decisions based
on word-of-mouth from other fund managers. Similarly, Shiller and Pound (1989) report
that some institutional investors do not use a systematic approach when making their
investment decisions and are influenced by other individuals.
If professional investors are incapable of isolating themselves from other
individuals when making their investment decisions, nonprofessional investors are
probably also subject to influence from others. Evidence in the literature supports this
logic and suggests that nonprofessional investors include others’ advice when making
financial decisions. For example, an individual’s choice of retirement plans is dependent
on the choice of other individuals working in the same department (Duflo and Saez
2000). Further, household investment decisions are correlated with their neighbors’
investment decisions and this correlation is a result of word-of-mouth between neighbors
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(Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2007). Word-of-mouth is stronger in states and in more
populated areas where individuals are more inclined to engage in social activities.
“…a third of individual investors say their initial interest [in a stock] was
prompted by persons other than a stockbroker” (Shiller and Pound, 1989
pg. 61).
“The great majority of the individual investors said they had done no
analysis of their own of the stock. Among individual investors, 28% in the
random sample and 45% in the rapid price increase sample said that they
not only knew of someone else who had bought the stock but were
influenced by this fact in their decision to purchase the stock” (Shiller and
Pound, 1989 pg. 62).
This evidence suggests that both types of financial market participants are
influenced by other individuals when making their investment decisions. The strong
reach of word-of-mouth in capital markets is not surprising. Word-of-mouth is more
influential in uncertain environments (Mourali et al., 2005) such as financial markets and
has more impact on products with attributes that are hard to verify pre and post purchase
(Lim and Chung, 2011) such as stocks.
Even though both groups of investors are subject to including others’ advice in
their investment decisions, this study focuses on nonprofessional investors for several
reasons. Moreover, the advice taking and advice giving literature shows that egocentric
advice discounting may depend on the differential level of knowledge between advice
takers and advice givers. Advice takers are less likely to discount advice when they are
less knowledgeable about the matter than advice givers. Further, advice takers are more
likely to rely on the advice giver’s recommendation when the task is complex (see
Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006). Since nonprofessional investors have lower knowledge than
professional investors and investment decisions are complex, relatively speaking,
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nonprofessional investors are more at risk for including word-of-mouth in their decisions
than professional investors. Therefore, this study focuses on nonprofessional investors.
Technological advances have drastically transformed the flow of information in
capital markets. Investors are now exposed to an incredible amount of information and
face new challenges of how to assess and use that information. They are not only exposed
to information reported by management or word-of-mouth from someone with which
they interact, but also to a significant number of other sources of information available in
social media such as corporate blogs, message boards, and online forums. Access to
these new sources of information is also facilitated by the advances of computer
technology. Individuals are not limited to computers to access the internet anymore. New
devices such as smartphones and tablets are also enhancing accessibility to the
information available on the internet.
Some researchers have reported that the advances of information technology have
reduced drifts and made investors more equipped to make financial decisions (Asthana,
2003). This idea is consistent with Levitt and Dubner’s (2005) view that the internet has
“mortally wounded” information asymmetry in financial markets. However, such a view
can be myopic. An increase in information can also enhance investors’ biases such as
confirmation bias (e.g., Park et al., 2013) or illusion of knowledge (e.g., Barber and
Odean, 2002). The effect of more information in financial markets depends on how
investors use this information (O’Conner, 2013).
Regulators such as the SEC seem to be focusing on the changes in communication
between corporation and investors. However, the internet not only enhances the
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communication between corporations and investors, but also facilitates communication
between investors. Nonprofessional investors are not only exposed to word-of-mouth, but
also to eWOM. They can receive and give advice to or from others on the internet at an
uncontrollable pace. Concerns about the increased interconnectedness between investors
were raised by then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt in his speech about on-line investing.
He stated:
“While the scams we have seen on the Internet are the same basic frauds that have
always accompanied the flow of money, the Internet’s speed, low cost and
relative anonymity give con artists access to an unprecedented number of
innocent investors…Lastly, I want to raise some points about chat rooms, which
increasingly have become a source of information and misinformation for many
investors. They have been compared to a high-tech version of morning gossip or
advice at the company water cooler. But, at least you knew your co-workers at the
water cooler. That just isn’t true on the Internet. And, I hope investors recognize
that” (Levitt, 1999).
One of the major concerns with the boom of social media is that anyone can
connect to the internet and share an opinion with the rest of the world, and that
individuals are using the internet to seek financial information and advice (Jones, 2006;
Sillence and Briggs, 2007; Wiliamson and Smith, 2010). More intriguingly, recent
studies have identified finance and health information as heavily trafficked domains in
the internet (Stanford et al., 2002; Sillence and Briggs, 2007).
Investors’ use of information reported on the internet raises red flags because
assessing the credibility of information available on the internet is a very difficult task
(Greer, 2003), and investors may not be well equipped to assess the credibility of
financial information in particular. Stanford et al. (2002) reported that consumers often
identify website design as their primary cues to assess financial website credibility. Also,
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research on investors’ confirmation bias behavior has shown that investors may discredit
credible information to confirm their initial beliefs (Thayer, 2011).
Nonprofessional investors may end up including erroneous or deceptive
information in their financial decisions. Deception experts are concerned about the
dissemination of lies or misleading information in the internet.
“…[T]he number of media now available to aid in the fabrication and
dissemination of lies is growing virtually unchecked and shows no signs of
stopping soon” (Meyer, 2010 pg. 12).
“Deciding which sources are worth our time, and which ones are worth our trust,
has become a burdensome task… A blog rumor or an eccentric political
commentator’s opinion can be passed to so many people so quickly that within a
few minutes thousands of people take it as fact” (Meyer, 2010 pg. 16).

The internet has become an important source of information that individuals
actively use. Where individuals obtain their information becomes a very concerning
issue. If internet users are only using advice from professionals, using information from
the internet may not be as concerning. Professional advice is subject to accountability and
in most instances is subject to regulatory sanctions. For example, the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has mechanisms in place to regulate the postings of its
members on social media (FINRA, 2010). While professionals are easier to monitor and
subjugate to regulatory laws, individual users of social media are not liable for sharing
information on the internet. Anyone can critique or share an opinion in a forum without
being accountable for their actions. Internet users are not reluctant to access and use
information from less regulated websites that are maintained by individuals and retailers.
Sillence et al. (2007) investigated consumers’ access to health information in year 2000
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and year 2005 and reported that individuals’ access to less regulated health sites has
increased.
Internet users’ preference for informal and unregulated websites over websites run
by professionals is not surprising. Internet users seek independent, unbiased, and
impartial advice (Sillence and Briggs, 2007; Sillence et al., 2007). To internet users,
professionals may not be impartial or may not act in their best interest. The lack of
independence and partiality may convey a negative first impression to the users of online
advice (Briggs et al., 2002).
“The very anonymity of many bloggers seems to give their words more power.
We don’t know them, yet it’s hard to dismiss them. What if we ignore them and
they turn out to be right? Are we at risk of missing out on the next important
insider tip, trend, or opportunity?” (Meyer, 2010 pg. 17).
An individual’s preference for non-expert advice is evident in online social
support forums where experts’ input are not welcomed (Vayreda and Antaki, 2009), and
in the health domain where patients seek and act upon unregulated advice retrieved from
the internet (Sillence et al., 2007). The advice taking and advice giving literature also
indicates that individuals may react negatively to a professionals’ advice. More precisely,
this literature shows that advice taking individuals are more likely to discount advice if
they think that the advice giver does not share the same goals (Bonaccio and Dalal,
2006).
The evidence above suggests that nonprofessional investors may discount advice
communicated by professional financial advisors because they may suspect that they are
trying to sell them something. Nonprofessional investors are less likely to discount advice
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from independent advice givers. “…[W]e face the danger of becoming overly dependent
on advice and information from people we’ll never meet, who have manufactured advice
information from people they have never met” (Meyer, 2010 pg. 17). Additionally, there
is evidence that the impact of eWOM is more significant in uncertain environments (Park
and Lee, 2009). Financial markets seem to be a place where eWOM may have a strong
impact on nonprofessional investors. The very nature of financial markets and the
knowledge structure of nonprofessional investors make them vulnerable to being
influenced by information posted on the internet.
There is a paucity of research on how investors use online information
(O’Conner, 2013), and how nonprofessional investors use the information posted by
unknown individuals. Further, how the advice available on the internet impacts
nonprofessional investors’ decision making is unclear. This study explores the influence
of information retrieved from forums on investors’ decision making.

Theoretical Development and Hypotheses
Figure 4 presents the theoretical model regarding the influence of bloggers’
comments on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest.
The model suggests that visual anonymity and investors’ social identification have an
impact on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and their willingness to invest.
More precisely, investors’ social identification moderates the direct effect of visual
anonymity on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and the indirect effect of
visual anonymity on investors’ willingness to invest.
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Figure 4: Theoretical Model
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This study draws on Spears and Lea’s (1992) SIDE model to predict the
behavioral implications of accessing information from investment forums on the internet.
SIDE is a CMC theory built on Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) Social Identification Theory
(SIT) and Turner et al.’s (1987) Social Categorization Theory (SCT). Using these two
“sister” theories, SIDE posits that social influence from computer mediated
communications is a function of identity saliency (Spears and Lea, 1992). More
precisely, the model predicts that individuals are more likely to be influenced by the
group norm in social media outlets when their group identity is salient (high social
identification) than when their personal identity is salient (low social identification). The
distinction between personal and social identity comes from SIT (Tajfel and Turner,
1986). According to SIT, an individual’s identity is placed on a continuum ranging from
personal identity where an individual acts at an interpersonal level to social identity
where an individual acts at the group level. At the social identity level, the self is
redefined from the lone individual to his membership in a certain group. At this level,
individuals begin to think in terms of (“us” vs. “them”) instead of (“me” vs. “them”).
Moving from personal identity to social identity along the identity continuum
depersonalizes the individual. The individual’s identity becomes defined by group
membership.
According to SCT, individuals categorize themselves with a group and define
other groups as well (Turner et al., 1987). The process of categorization allows
individuals to create order to a chaotic social structure. Individuals engage in a
comparative process where they group themselves with individuals who share common
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characteristics such as a “common threat” and distinguish themselves from individuals
who do not share common characteristics. Intragroup differences are always smaller than
intergroup differences. According to SCT, when social identity is salient (individuals
define themselves as group members), individuals become influenced by the group norm
(Turner et al., 1987).
In a capital market setting, communication flows from management to investors
or between investors. When management communicates information to capital markets,
an investor can individually assess the credibility of this information and act accordingly.
Alternatively, the investor can assess the credibility of the information by accessing the
opinion of others who belong to the same group. The former case occurs when personal
identity is salient and results in low social identification: “I, an individual investor” vs.
“management”. In that case, an individual is not influenced by others. The latter case
occurs when social identity is salient and results in high social identification: “us, a group
of investors” vs. “management”. In that case, an individual’s assessment of the
information is influenced by others. According to SIDE, an investor’s evaluation of the
credibility of information communicated by management and willingness to invest is
dependent on the saliency of his/her identity (Spears and Lea, 1992). Investors with high
social identification with others will be more influenced by their comments than investors
with low social identification. Therefore, investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility
will be more influenced by bloggers’ comments when investors have high social
identification with the group of bloggers than when investors have low social
identification with the group of bloggers.
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SIDE also accounts for the effect of visual anonymity on investors’ decision
making (Spears and Lea, 1992). Visual anonymity determines the degree of anonymity of
bloggers. For example, when bloggers’ comments are communicated via text, their
identity remains anonymous to the readers of the forum. On the other hand, when
bloggers’ comments are communicated via video, their identity is revealed to the users of
the blog and to investors’ accessing the forum. In this case, investors have access to
additional information to make their decisions.
According to SIDE, the effect of this additional information is conditional on
investors’ degree of social identification. When individuals have high social
identification, visual anonymity obfuscates intragroup differences. Individuals are less
likely to discover intragroup differences when other group members are visually
anonymous than when other group members are not visually anonymous. However, if
visual anonymity is compromised, individuals can see intragroup differences and these
differences will lower their identification with the group. Therefore, individuals with high
social identification will adhere more to the group norm and be more influenced by group
members when other group members are visually anonymous than when visual
anonymity is compromised.
Visual anonymity has the opposite effect on individuals with low social
identification (Spears and Lea, 1992). When individuals do not identify themselves with
the group, they already believe that there are intragroup differences. Visual anonymity
enhances these beliefs because individuals do not have a chance to identify intragroup
communalities. When visual anonymity is compromised, individuals may see less
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intragroup differences than what they initially formed and, as a result, identify more with
the group. Therefore, individuals with low social identification will adhere less to the
group norm and be less influenced by the group members when other group members are
visually anonymous than when visual anonymity is compromised.
Bloggers on social media are not always anonymous. Bloggers are not limited to
typing statements. They can easily attach a picture to their profile, add a link to a personal
website, record their own voice, or post a video to express their views. These additional
features provide new information to investors. For example, when communicating
information via video instead of text, bloggers provide new information about their
identity. Nevertheless, the effect of this additional information on investors’ perceptions
of disclosure credibility is conditional on investors’ degree of social identification.
H1:

Bloggers’ comments will have more (less) influence on investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility when investors have high (low) social
identification and read bloggers’ written comments than when investors
have high (low) social identification and view bloggers’ oral comments.

Investors assess the credibility of information communicated by management
before making investment decisions (Mercer, 2004). Despite the importance of disclosure
credibility to investors, very few studies have investigated the effect of disclosure
credibility on investors’ willingness to invest. Findings from the archival literature
indicate that such a relationship exists (Mishra et al., 2011; Ng et al., 2013). These studies
indicate that a positive relationship between disclosure credibility and willingness to
invest exists and that capital markets react negatively to reduced disclosure credibility.
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Findings from the auditing literature also suggest that such a relationship exists.
For example, Krishnamurthy et al. (2006) investigated how the market reacted to Arthur
Andersen’s clients after the audit firm was accused of obstruction of justice. Their results
show that the market reacted negatively to Arthur Andersen’s clients. Audits should
provide credibility to ensure that the disclosures of a certain company are credible and
reflect the true economic state. The accusations made against Arthur Anderson created
the perception that the disclosures made by firms audited by Arthur Andersen may not be
credible, and thus caused investors to react negatively. Based on this prior research, this
study predicts that:
H2:

Disclosure credibility will have a positive effect on investors’ willingness
to invest.

Media richness theory (Daft and Lengel, 1984) suggests that richer media
communicates information more effectively in complex decision making environments.
The investment setting is a complex decision environment where richer media such as
video forum comments should communicate information more effectively and
consequently have stronger influence on investors’ willingness to invest. Thus, investors’
willingness to invest may be influenced by visual anonymity such that video comments
may have a stronger effect on investors’ willingness to invest than text comments.
Based on H1, visual anonymity has an impact on investors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility that is moderated by investors’ social identification, investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility have an effect on investors’ willingness to invest,
and visual anonymity has an impact on investors’ willingness to invest. Therefore, the
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effect of visual anonymity on investors’ willingness to invest flows through investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility. In other words, visual anonymity has an indirect
effect on investors’ willingness to invest. Since investors’ social identification moderates
the direct effect of visual anonymity on disclosure credibility, the indirect effect is also
moderated by investors’ social identification. Therefore, this study proposes that:
H3:

Bloggers’ comment will have a stronger (weaker) effect on investors’
willingness to invest through their perceptions of disclosure credibility
when investors have high (low) social identification and read bloggers’
written comments than when investors have high (low) social
identification and view bloggers’ oral comments.

Methods
Design
To test the theoretical model advanced in this study, a 2X2 experiment with social
identification (low social identification vs. high social identification) and visual
anonymity (text comments vs. video comments) as the independent variables was
conducted. Social identification was manipulated by telling the participant whether they
were or were not members of an investment forum. In the high social identification
condition, participants were told: “You are an active member of InvestorsTalk: you visit
the forum daily, comment often, and have developed relationships with the other
members of the forum.” In the low social identification condition, participants were told:
“You are not a member of this forum and you have never visited this forum before.”
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Visual anonymity was manipulated by providing the participants with text comments in
the text format condition and video comments in the video format condition.

Procedures
Participants were invited to participate in a research study about investment
decisions. Once they agreed to participate, participants were told that they had
accumulated $50,000 of personal savings, and that they had decided to invest $10,000 of
these savings to purchase stocks. Then, participants were provided with information
about a hypothetical company: Morningblend21. The company was described as an
international coffee manufacturer and retail operator in the United States. Participants
were provided with a brief business article about Morningblend’s CEO: Mark Ray. The
article highlighted that Mark Ray had a good reputation and concluded with the following
statement, “Analysts seem to have very positive views about Morningblend – a testament
to management’s reputation for open and honest communication with the investment
community.” Participants were also provided with Morningblend’s income statement for
two consecutive years.
Then, participants were informed that Mark Ray announced an earnings’
restatement and were provided with a video where they were able to watch Mark Ray
announcing the earnings’ restatement22. After watching the earnings’ restatement,
participants were provided with analysts’ forecast. The analysts’ forecast stated that

21

The experimental materials for this study are adapted from Elliott et al. (2012). The description of the
CEO’s reputation was adapted from Cianci and Kaplan (2010).
22
Participants had to watch the full video to be included in the study. Participants who tried to move
forward before the end of the video were directed away from the instrument.
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analysts expected Morningblend stock to keep increasing. Then, participants were told
that they had access to an independent investment forum where members of the forum
have expressed their opinions and written comments about Mark Ray’s earnings’
restatement. All the comments in the forum indicated that members of the forum did not
believe the explanation provided by Mark Ray for the earnings’ restatement and that they
were not willing to invest in Morningblend. While the content was the same, the
comments were provided to participants either in text or video format. After receiving the
comments, participants were asked to answer a set of questions to capture their
perceptions of disclosure credibility and their willingness to invest, and a set of basic
demographic questions.

Measured Variables
Investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility was measured by capturing
participants’ agreement that the explanation for the earnings’ restatement was believable,
accurate, trustworthy, unbiased, and complete. Participants’ agreement was anchored on a
seven point likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. This measure of
disclosure credibility was adapted from the message credibility literature (Chesney and
Su, 2010; Flanagin and Metzger, 2007, 2003, 2000). To measure participants’ willingness
to invest, participants were asked to indicate how much of their $10,000 they would
invest in Morningblend.
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Control Variables
Financial literacy consists of individuals’ knowledge about basic financial
concepts. Findings from the literature on investors’ judgment and decision making
suggest that individuals’ financial literacy has an effect on investors’ decisions (Hilgert et
al., 2003; Lusardi, 2008; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; Hung et al., 2009; Lusardi and
Mitchell, 2011; Van Rooij et al., 2011). For example, recent evidence suggests that
individuals with a better understanding of basic financial concepts are less likely to rely
on external advice (Van Rooij et al., 2011). In the context of this study, financial literacy
may have an effect on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and on their
willingness to invest. As a result, investors’ financial literacy is included in the analyses
as a control variable. To control for the effect of financial literacy on participants’
judgment and decision making, a measure of financial literacy was added as a control
variable. Financial literacy was measured using five items about basic financial concepts
developed by FINRA (FINRA, 2009a; FINRA, 2009b; FINRA, 2012). Scores on this
measure indicate the number of items answered correctly and range from “zero” (low
financial literacy) to “five” (high financial literacy).
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Participants
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) was used to collect 401 usable responses from
nonprofessional investors23, 24. To limit the pool of participants to individuals with some
investing experience, the study included three screening questions as follows:
1. Have you ever made personal investments in the common stock of a
company?
2. Approximately, how many years of personal investment experience do you
have?
3. Approximately, how many times have you purchased common stock of a
company as a personal investment?
Individuals who answered “no” to the first question or “less than one” to either of
the next two questions were directed away from the experiment.
Participants who completed the experiment were paid $3 for their participation in
the study. Participants spent an average time of 21.67 minutes completing the
experimental materials, the equivalent of an average hourly wage of $8.31. On average,
participants have 6.59 years of personal investing experience, have purchased common
stock 20.42 times, have taken 2.28 accounting classes, and have taken 2.01 finance
classes. Of the participants, 60.3% are male, 39.7% are female, 68.8% have prior

23

Initial data collection resulted in 483 observations. 69 responses were deleted because they had duplicate
IP addresses indicating that some participants may have participated more than once. Also, 13 responses
were deleted because they had missing data.
24
MTurk offers information about participants’ residency, assignment (HIT) approval rate, and the number
of approved assignments. This information was used to exclude individuals coming from outside the US,
who had less than 500 approved assignments, or who had an approval rate lower than 95%. MTurk
participants that did not meet these criteria were not able to see the invitation for the study.
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business work experience with an average of 10.72 years, 91.5% have used financial
statements to evaluate a company’s performance, 13.7% have prior work experience in
financial analysis with an average of 4.6 years, and 91.8% plan to invest in the common
stock of a company at some time in the future. Results from the financial literacy measure
indicate that 46.4% of participants answered all of the financial literacy questions
correctly and the average score for all participants was 4.16 out of 5.00. Demographics of
the participants are shown in Table 14.
Table 14: Demographic Information
Mean
Average number of years of investing experience
Average number of times making purchases of common stock
Average number of accounting classes taken
Average number of finance classes taken
Gender
Male
Female
Age
18-20 years
21-25 years
26-29 years
30-39 years
40-49 years
50-59 years
>60
Ethnicity
Asian
African American
Hispanic
Native American
Caucasian
Others
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6.59
20.42
2.28
2.01
Number

Standard
Deviation
6.00
28.87
3.75
3.52
Percent

242
159

60.3%
39.7%

2
54
78
160
59
35
13

0.5%
13.5%
19.5%
39.9%
14.7%
8.7%
3.2%

30
32
29
2
304
4

7.5%
8.0%
7.2%
0.5%
75.8%
1.0%

Number
Education
Less than high school
High School/ GED
Some College
2-year college degree
Undergraduate degree
Master degree
Doctoral degree
Used Financial Statements to Evaluate Company Performance
Yes
No
Prior Business Work Experience (Average is 10.72 years)
Yes
No
Prior Work Experience in financial analysis (Average is 4.6
years)
Yes
No
Plan to Invest in Common Stock in Future
Yes
No
Financial Literacy Scores (Average is 4.16)
Participants who had five correct answers
Participants who had four correct answers
Participants who had three correct answers
Participants who had two correct answers
Participants who had one correct answers
Participants who had no correct answers

Percent

2
27
99
54
164
47
8

0.5%
6.7%
24.7%
13.5%
40.9%
11.7%
2.0%

367
34

91.5%
8.5%

276
125

68.8%
31.2%

55
346

13.7%
86.3%

368
33

91.8%
8.2%

186
130
58
19
7
1

46.4%
32.4%
14.5%
4.7%
1.7%
0.2%

At the end of the experiment, participants were asked two manipulation check
questions: whether they were members of the forum and whether they received the
bloggers’ comments in a text or video format. Participants who failed to answer either of
these manipulation check questions correctly were directed away from the instrument.
Also, to ensure that participants watched or read all of the bloggers’ comments, a timer
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was set to exclude participants who did not spend enough time to watch or read the entire
set of the bloggers’ comments.
After completing the experiment, participants answered six questions to measure
the degree of their social identification. Three questions were adapted from Doosje et
al.’s (1995) measure of social identification. This measure was identified by Haslam
(2004) as a suitable measure for social identification. Three additional questions were
developed specifically for this study25. To verify that the social identification
manipulation was successful, an independent sample t-test was conducted to compare
individuals’ social identification in the low social identification condition to individuals’
social identification in the high social identification condition. Results indicate that
participants in the low social identification have a significantly lower (p < 0.001) rating
of social identification (mean = 4.12; standard deviation = 1.10) than individuals in the
high social identification condition (mean = 5.62; standard deviation = 0.86). Therefore,
the social identification manipulation was successful.

Results
In order to validate the measures of social identification and disclosure credibility,
a principal component analysis with a Promax rotation was conducted. Results from the
principal component analysis suggest that all items loaded on two components. All
disclosure credibility items loaded on one component and all social identification items
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Untabulated results show that all six items used to measure social identification loaded on one
component and that this measure had an acceptable level of internal reliability. As a result, the
average score on these items was used to measure participants’ social identification.
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loaded on the other component. Results from the principal component analysis are
reported in Table 15 Panel A.
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Table 15: Measurement Validation
Panel A: Principal Component Analysis (with Promax Rotation)

Social Identification (1): I see myself as a member of the forum.
Social Identification (2): I feel strong ties with the other members of the
forum.
Social Identification (3): I identify with the other members of the forum.
Social Identification (4): I share certain traits with the other members of
the forum.
Social Identification (5): I share the same interest with the other
members of the forum.
Social Identification (6): I can relate to the other members of the forum.
Disclosure Credibility (1): The explanation for the earnings' restatement
is believable.
Disclosure Credibility (2): The explanation for the earnings restatement
is accurate.
Disclosure Credibility (3): The explanation for the earnings restatement
is trustworthy.
Disclosure Credibility (4): The explanation for the earnings restatement
is unbiased.
Disclosure Credibility (5): The explanation for the earnings restatement
is complete.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
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Components
1
2
-.045
.801
.878

-.177

.905

-.246

.804

-.256

.715

-.189

.833

-.331

-.237

.910

-.242

.918

-.258

.933

-.137

.773

-.206

.838

Panel B: Analyses for Discriminant and Convergent Validity
Average
Composite
Variance
Social
Reliability
Extracted
Identification
Social
0.905
0.618
0.786
Identification
Disclosure
0.925
0.714
-0.272
Credibility

Disclosure
Credibility

Bolded values on the diagonals indicate the square root of the Average Extracted Variance (AVE).
Italicized values represent interconstruct correlations
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0.845

To verify that the two measures had acceptable psychometric properties,
discriminant and convergent validity were investigated. Results from these analyses are
reported in Table 15 Panel B. The Average Variance Extracted (AVE) from each
construct is higher than .5, indicating an acceptable level of convergent validity. Also, the
AVE is higher than the correlation between the two constructs, indicating an acceptable
level of discriminant validity. To verify the internal reliability of each measure, a
composite reliability index was calculated for each measure. The composite reliability for
each measure is higher than .7 indicating an acceptable internal reliability. As a result,
participants’ average scores on the disclosure credibility items and the social
identification items was used to measure investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility
and social identification respectively.
H1 suggests that bloggers’ comment should have more (less) influence on
disclosure credibility when investors have high (low) social identification and read text
comments than when investors have high (low) social identification and view video
comments. As illustrated above, the norm created by the bloggers’ comments is that the
information communicated by Mark Ray is not credible. As a result, a stronger influence
of the bloggers comment is reflected through a lower perception of disclosure credibility.
To test H1, an ANCOVA is conducted26. Visual anonymity (text forum comments vs.
video forum comment) and social identification (low vs. high social) are the independent

Untabulated results show that participants’ demographic information do not differ significantly across the
experimental conditions.
26
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variables, and disclosure credibility is the dependent variable. As discussed above,
financial literacy is included in the analysis as a control variable.
To verify whether any of the demographic variables have a significant impact on
investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility, a regression analysis was conducted with
investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility as the dependent variable and the
demographic variables as the independent variable. Untabulated results from the
regression analysis suggest that investors’ years of investing experience has a significant
relationship with investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility. Therefore, investors’
years of investing experience is added to the analyses as a control variable as well.
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 16 Panel A show that the moderating
effect of social identification are in the opposite direction to what is expected from the
theoretical model. Based on H1, participants with high social identification and who view
video comments should have higher perceptions of disclosure credibility than participants
with high social identification condition and who read text comments. Also, participants
with low social identification and who read text comments should have higher
perceptions of disclosure credibility than participants with low social identification
condition and who view video comments. Descriptive statistics shown in Panel A suggest
that participants with high social identification and who viewed video comments have
lower disclosure credibility (mean 3.39; standard deviation = 1.25) than participants with
high social identification condition and who read text comments (mean 3.45; standard
deviation = 1.30). Also, participants with low social identification and who read text
comments have lower disclosure credibility (mean = 3.58; standard deviation = 1.17)
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than participants with low social identification condition and who viewed video
comments (mean = 3.64; standard deviation = 1.20).
The results of the ANCOVA analysis are reported in Table 16 Panel B 27. While
not hypothesized, the results suggest that disclosure credibility is significantly lower for
participants in the high social identification condition than the low social identification
condition (p = 0.028) and that visual anonymity does not have a significant effect on
disclosure credibility (p = 0.483). Results from the ANCOVA analysis also suggest that
the interaction between social identification and visual anonymity is not statistically
significant (p = 0.176). Therefore, these results fail to provide support that social
identification moderates the effect of visual anonymity on disclosure credibility set forth
in H1.

A homogeneity test was conducted to verify the equal variance assumption. Results from Levene’s test
fail to reject the assumption of equal variance. Since the equal variance assumption has been met, the
unequal cell sizes are not problematic (Glass et al., 1972).
27
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Table 16: Disclosure Credibility
Panel A: Disclosure Credibility – Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]
Social Identification
Low
High
Visual Anonymity
3.58
3.45
Text
(1.17)
(1.30)
[103]
[98]
3.64
3.39
Video
(1.24)
(1.25)
[101]
[99]
3.61
3.42
Average
(1.20)
(1.27)
[204]
[197]

Average
3.52
(1.23)
[201]
3.52
(1.25)
[200]
[401]

Panel B: ANCOVA Model of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable =Disclosure
Credibility)
Source
S.S
d.f.
M.S.
F-Ratio p-value*
0.003
1
0.003
0.002
0.483
Visual Anonymity
5.312
1
5.312
3.666
0.028
Social Identification
1.262
1
1.262
0.871
0.176
Visual Anonymity * Social Identification
Covariates:
0.241
1
0.241
0.166
0.342
Financial Literacy
Investment Experience (in years)
37.153
1
37.153
25.643 <0.001
572.299
395
1.449
Error
5570.840 401
Total
*All p-values are one-tailed
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H2 and H3 are tested by conducting a mediation and a moderated mediation
analyses available in PROCESS (Hayes, 2013). A mediation analysis is conducted to
investigate the effect of disclosure credibility on willingness to invest and to investigate
whether disclosure credibility mediates the relationship between visual anonymity and
willingness to invest. To test the mediation model, visual anonymity is defined as the
predictor, investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility is defined as the mediator, and
willingness to invest is defined as the outcome variable. Financial literacy and investing
experience in years are defined as covariates28. Results of the mediation analysis,
reported in Table 17 Panel A, indicate that disclosure credibility has a significant direct
effect (p < 0.001) on willingness to invest. These results support the predictions made in
H2.
In order to test whether disclosure credibility mediates the relationship between
visual anonymity and willingness to invest, the indirect effect must also be significant.
Results reported in Table 17 Panel B show that the indirect effect is not statistically
significant because the bootstrapped confidence interval ranges from a low of -194.137 to
a high of 207.837. The presence of zero within the bootstrapped confidence interval
means that the indirect effect is not statistically significant29. H3 predicts a moderated

Two demographic variables had a significant effect on investors’ willingness to invest. More precisely,
the number of times investors purchased common stocks and investors’ age had a significant relationship
with investors’ willingness to invest. Including the number of times investors purchased common stocks
and investors’ age as control variables produces similar results. Therefore, they are not included in the
analyses.
29
The number of samples for the bootstrap analysis was set to 10,000. Also, the confidence intervals are
bias-corrected confidence intervals. The level of confidence was set to 90% to generate one tailed results.
28

160

mediation, the failure of finding a mediating effect of disclosure credibility results in a
failure of providing support for H3.
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Table 17: Mediation Analysis of Visual Anonymity on Investors’ Willingness to Invest
Panel A: Direct Effect of Visual Anonymity on Investors Willingness to Invest

(Constant)
Predictor:
Visual
Anonymity
Mediator:
Disclosure
Credibility
Covariates:
Financial
Literacy
Investment
Experience (in
years)

Coefficient

SE

t

Sig.
(One-tailed)

LLCI

ULCI

-1285.09

539.144

-2.3836

0.009

-2173.98

-396.196

-125.916

206.4395

-0.6099

0.271

-466.275

214.4429

1003.318

85.9004

11.68

<0.001

861.6933

1144.943

147.4764

107.571

1.371

0.086

-29.877

324.8298

-27.1271

18.1776

-1.4923

0.068

-57.0967

2.8425

Panel B: Indirect Effect of Visual Anonymity on Investors Willingness to Invest
Bootstrapped Bootstrapped
Mediator
Effect
Boot SE
LLCI
ULCI
Disclosure Credibility
5.3867
121.965
-194.137
207.8367
LLCI: Lower level confidence interval
ULCI: Upper level confidence interval
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Supplemental Analyses
Additional analyses are conducted to investigate the effect of visual anonymity
and social identification on willingness to invest. Table 18 Panel A presents the
descriptive statistics for the four cells. The descriptive statistics suggest that participants
in the high social identification condition invested more (mean = $2,619.28; standard
deviation = $2,438.04) than participants in the low social identification condition (mean
= $2,610.16; standard deviation = $2,356.36). The descriptive statistics also suggest that
participants with high social identification and who viewed video comments invested less
(mean = $2,330.00; standard deviation = $2,474.56) than participants with high social
identification condition and who read text comments (mean = $2,911.51; standard
deviation = $2,377.48). Also, participants with low social identification and who read
text comments invested less (mean = $2,448.31; standard deviation = $2,233.90) than
participants with low social identification condition and who viewed video comments
(mean = $2,775.31; standard deviation = $2,475.24).
Similar to H1, an ANCOVA analysis is conducted with willingness to invest as
the dependent variable. Financial literacy is defined as a covariate. Table 18 Panel B
presents the results of the ANCOVA analysis and the results are contrary to expectations.
Results from Panel B suggest that visual anonymity and social identification did not have
a main effect on willingness to invest (p = 0.291 and p = 0.495, respectively). Results
from the ANCOVA analysis also show that the interaction between visual anonymity and
social identification is statistically significant (p = 0.028). The results show that
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participants with low social identification are more influenced by bloggers’ comments
when they read text comments than when they view video comments, and participants
with high social identification are more influenced by bloggers’ comments when they
view video comments than when they read text comments. As described above, the
directionality of this interaction is in the opposite direction to the predictions made by the
theoretical model advanced in this study. According to SIDE, participants in the low
social identification condition should have invested more when they read text comments
than when they viewed video comments and participants in the high social identification
condition should have invested more when they viewed video comments than when they
read text comments. The plot of the interaction is shown in Figure 5 and the plot of the
expected interaction is plotted in Figure 6.
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Table 18: Investors’ Willingness to Invest
Panel A: Investors’ Willingness to invest – Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]
Social Identification
Low
High
Average
Visual Anonymity
$2,448.31
$2,911.51
$2,674.15
Text
($2,233.90)
($2,377.48)
($2,310.92)
[103]
[98]
[201]
$2,775.21
$2,330.00
$2,554.83
Video
($2,475.24)
($2,474.56)
($2,478.74)
[101]
[99]
[200]
$2,610.16
$2,619.28
Average
($2,356.36)
($2,438.04)
[401]
[204]
[197]
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Panel B: ANCOVA Model of Between-Subjects Effects (Dependent Variable = Willingness
to Invest)
Source
S.S
d.f.
M.S.
F-Ratio p-value*
1726892.466
1
1726892.466
0.302
0.291
Visual Anonymity
749.574
1
749.574
0.000
0.495
Social Identification
Visual Anonymity * Social
20858037.928
1
20858037.928
3.654
0.028
Identification
Covariates:
9310724.638
1
9310724.638
1.631
0.101
Financial Literacy
2260761174.544 396
5708992.865
Error
5033553256.000 401
Total
*All p-values are one-tailed
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Dependent Variable: Investors' Willingness to
Invest
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Figure 5: Found Interaction
Dependent Variable: Investors' Willingness to
Invest
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Figure 6: Expected Interaction
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Summary of Findings
Findings from this study suggest that social identification impacts investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility. More precisely, the more investors identify with the
group of bloggers’ the less they perceive management disclosures’ to be credible. This
suggests that investors’ are more influenced by the group norm created by bloggers’
comments when they identify with the group of bloggers than when they do not identify
with the group of bloggers. This evidence suggests that information available in forums
impact investors’ judgment and decision making. Interestingly, investors’ social
identification, by itself, does not have an effect on their willingness to invest.
While the results of this study suggest that social identification does not moderate
the effect of visual anonymity on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility, it does
moderate the effect of visual anonymity on investors’ willingness to invest. As shown in
the supplementary analyses, social identification moderated the effect of visual
anonymity on willingness to invest such that investors with low social identification had
a higher willingness to invest when they viewed bloggers’ video comments than when
they read bloggers’ text comments; and, investors with high social identification had a
higher willingness to invest when they read bloggers’ comments than when they viewed
bloggers’ comments. These results are in the opposite direction to the predictions made
by SIDE. According to SIDE, when individuals have high social identification, visual
anonymity obfuscates intragroup differences. In other words, video comments should
highlight identity differences that are not accessible in the text comment format. As a
results, bloggers comment should have a lower effect on investors’ decision when visual
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anonymity is compromised. Findings from the supplemental analyses suggest that, for
investors’ with high social identification, bloggers’ comments had a stronger effect on
investors’ willingness to invest when they were in a video format rather than in a text
format.
The SIDE model also suggests that when individuals have low social
identification, visual anonymity obfuscates intragroup similarities. In other words, video
comments should highlight identity similarities that are not accessible in the text
comment format. As a result, bloggers’ comments should have a stronger effect on
investors’ decisions when visual anonymity is compromised. Findings from the
supplemental analyses suggest that, for investors with low social identification, bloggers’
comment had a weaker effect on investors’ willingness to invest when they were in a
video format rather than in a text format. Overall, the results of this study fail to support
the theoretical predictions made by the SIDE model. Nevertheless, the results provide
support for the moderating role of social identification, but in the opposite direction and
only with respect to willingness to invest, not disclosure credibility.
Also, findings suggest that investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and
their willingness to invest do not share the same antecedents. Some factors may have an
impact on investors’ disclosure credibility and not their willingness to invest and vice
versa. These findings suggest that studies that focus on investigating the effect of certain
factors on disclosure credibility should investigate the effect of these factors on investors’
investment decisions as well.
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Conclusions
Investors are consistently seeking new ways of acquiring information to reduce
the information asymmetry between them and managers, and to reduce information cost.
The flow of information in capital markets is witnessing a drastic change. Investors have
access to numerous outlets of information and are exposed to the risk of including
misleading information in their decision making process. The quality of investors’
decisions is dependent on the quality of information they access. This study focused on a
specific source of information: investment forums. The use of the internet has facilitated
investors’ access to unmonitored and unregulated investment forums. Information
retrieved in these forums may be misleading and investors should be hesitant to
incorporate that information into their decisions.
From a theoretical perspective, this study fails to support the predictions made by
the SIDE model. Based on the SIDE model, the first hypothesis in this study predicts that
bloggers’ comment will have more (less) influence on investors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility when investors have high (low) social identification and read
bloggers’ comments than when investors have high (low) social identification and view
bloggers’ comments. The findings suggest that the effect of visual anonymity on
investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility does not depend on investors’ social
identification with other members of the forum. Therefore, these findings fail to provide
support for the hypothesized effect of social identification and visual anonymity on
investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility.
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The results provide support for the hypothesized positive effect of investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility on their willingness to invest. The results also
suggest that visual anonymity does not have an effect on investors’ willingness to invest
through investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility. As a result, the moderating effect
of social identification on this effect could not be tested. Thus, the results fail to provide
evidence to support the predicted moderated mediation.
Nevertheless, the results suggest that social identification, by itself, influences
investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility. This result indicates that information
from forums such as the one used in this study are becoming part of investors’ decision
making and that the degree of their social identification with members of the forum
strengthens the influence of these forums. In other words, members are more influenced
by the norm created within these forums than non-members. Also, findings from the
supplemental analyses suggest that whether investors are forum members and whether
investors have access to clues about bloggers’ identity jointly affect their willingness to
invest. This finding suggests that investors who are not a member of a forum invested
more when they had access to clues about bloggers’ identity than when they did not have
access to bloggers’ identity. Also, investors who are member of a forum invested more
when they did not have access to clues about bloggers’ identity than when they had
access to clues about bloggers’ identity. Overall, these findings, although not
hypothesized, provide evidence that information in social media has an impact on
investors’ judgment and decision making.
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While this study provides preliminary evidence that social identification impacts
investors’ decision making, several questions remain unanswered. Findings from this
study suggest that investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and their willingness to
invest are impacted differently by social identification and visual anonymity. Future
research should investigate why certain factors impact investors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility and not their willingness to invest, or vice versa. Also, future
research should investigate whether other social media outlets impact investors’ judgment
differently. For example, does information from blogs impact investors’ decision more
than information from forums? Does a company involvement in social media impact the
way investors’ process information? Do investors process information from regulated
social media differently from information in unregulated social media?
As with all studies, this study has some limitations. The data was collected from
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Individual investors from Amazon Mechanical Turk are very
familiar with internet tools and spend a significant amount of time online. Therefore,
findings from this study may not be generalizable to nonprofessional investors who are
not internet savvy or do not spend a significant amount of time seeking information
online.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this dissertation is on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility.
All three chapters investigate the effect of certain factors on investors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility and the impact of these factors on investors’ willingness to invest.
Findings from this dissertation support the important role of disclosure credibility in
investors’ judgment and decision making process by suggesting that investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility is a key determinant of their willingness to invest.
Across all chapters investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility had a significant effect
on investors’ willingness to invest.
Each chapter of this dissertation contributes to the literature by providing a better
understanding of investors’ evaluation of disclosure credibility. Findings from the first
study provide evidence that managers’ pre-existing reputation has an effect on investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility, such that investors have higher perceptions of
disclosure credibility when managers have a good pre-existing reputation than when
managers have bad pre-existing reputation. This finding suggests that investors use
management’s pre-existing reputation as a heuristic to evaluate disclosure credibility.
Findings from Study 1 also show, as suggested by Mercer (2004), that management
credibility has an effect on disclosure credibility and that management credibility
mediates the relationship between management’s pre-existing reputation and investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility. While these findings provide support for Mercer’s
(2004) framework, they highlight and raise new measurement issues. Findings from
Study 1 suggest that the trust component of management credibility and disclosure
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credibility loaded in one component. In other words, disclosure credibility and investors’
trust in mangers may not be distinguishable constructs and that care must be taken when
testing Mercer’s (2004) framework. The trust component of management credibility
should be extracted before investigating the relationship between management credibility
and disclosure credibility. Otherwise, analyses may suffer from statistical issues such as
multicollinearity due to the high correlation between the trust component of management
credibility and disclosure credibility.
Results from Study 1 also provide support for the moderating role of deception
detection DAs. The direct and indirect effects of pre-existing reputation on disclosure
credibility were diluted by detecting deception. These results suggest that deception
detection DAs impact investors’ judgment and decision making and that these DAs can
be used to detect deception at an early stage and can help investors make better decisions.
Study 2 investigates the effect of detecting linguistic manipulations in corporate
narratives on investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and their willingness to
invest when managers have an incentive to manipulate the information in these reports
and when managers have no incentive to manipulate the information in these reports. The
results from Study 2 show that the effect of detecting linguistic manipulations on
investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest does not differ
across managerial incentives. These results provide evidence that managerial incentives
do not reduce the effect of these DAs on investors’ judgment and decision making and,
therefore, provide evidence that investors can use these DAs to improve their decisions.
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These results also provide insight to the corporate social responsibility literature.
A company’s environmental performance had an effect on investors’ perception of
disclosure credibility and their willingness to invest, even after controlling for investors’
environmental beliefs. These results suggest that a company’s environmental
performance matters and that companies may be able to gain capital by improving their
environmental performance.
Study 3 explores whether the format of forum comments affects investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility and their willingness to invest, and how social
identification impacts this relationship. There is a paucity of research on the implications
of the growth of social media in the financial world. Findings from this study contribute
to the literature by highlighting some of the concerns associated with the spread of
information on social media and by explaining how information in social media impacts
investors’ decision making.
Study 3 shows that social identification impacts investors’ perceptions of
disclosure credibility such that, the more investors identify themselves with a group of
forum users, the more they are influenced by forum comments. Findings from Study 3
also suggest that social identification and visual anonymity have a joint effect on
investors’ willingness to invest. More precisely, the effect of visual anonymity on
investors’ willingness to invest depends on individuals’ social identification. On the one
hand, individuals with low social identification are more influenced by forum comments
when they read forum comments than when they view forum comments. On the other
hand, individuals with high social identification are more influenced by the forum
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comments when they view video comments than when they read text comments. While
results from Study 3 are in the opposite direction to the expectations made in the
theoretical model, they provide evidence that forum comments may impact investors’
decisions and that individuals’ social identification may explain the effect of these
comments on their investment decisions.

Future Research
Study 1 operationalized deception detection by informing participants that there is
a 90% likelihood that the person in the downloaded video is being deceptive in the
deception detected condition and that there is a 10% likelihood that the person in the
downloaded video is being deceptive in the deception not detected condition. Future
research should investigate whether specific features of the DA such as the accuracy of
deception detection may impact investors’ reactions to the output of the DA. For
example, future research can investigate whether the effect of the output of the deception
detection DA changes when the DA’s accuracy is lowered to 80% vs. 20%, 70% vs.30%,
or 60% vs.40%. Lowering the accuracy of the DA may dilute the size of the violation and
therefore, the effectiveness of these DAs.
Moreover, CEOs understanding of such technology remains unknown. Future
research should investigate whether CEOs ex-ante vs. ex-post knowledge about such
technology affects investors’ reactions to the DA. For example, future research can
investigate whether detecting deception for a CEO who knows ex-ante that the video
disclosure is going to be analyzed has a similar effect on investors as detecting deception
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for a CEO who does not know ex-ante that the video disclosure is going to be analyzed.
CEOs reaction to such technology may affect investors’ beliefs about the accuracy of the
DA.
Linguistic manipulation is operationalized in Study 2 by informing participants
that analyzed narrative was not free from tone manipulations. Nevertheless, tone is one of
many other types of linguistic manipulations. Future research should investigate whether
the type of linguistic manipulation detected has a different effect on nonprofessional
investors’ decision making. For example, does a DA that detects optimism in corporate
reports have a similar effect on investors’ judgment and decision making as a DA that
detects certainty? Also, in Study 2, linguistic manipulations are detected in the MD&A
section of the annual report, which is reviewed by the external auditor. The effect of
detecting linguistic manipulations may not have a similar effect if it is detected in a report
that is not subject to a review by external auditors. Future research should explore
whether the location of language manipulations matters.
Research on the effect of social media on investors’ judgment and decision
making is still at its infancy. Study 3 provides some insight on how information on social
media impacts investors’ decision making, but several questions remain unanswered.
Study 3 provides participants with comments from an unregulated forum. Future research
should investigate whether other social media outlets impact investors’ judgments
differently. For example, does information from blogs impact investors’ decisions more
than information from forums? Does a company involvement in social media impact the
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way investors process information? Do investors process information from regulated
social media differently from information from unregulated social media?
Findings from Study 3 also suggest that social identification and visual anonymity
impact investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest
differently. Findings suggest that social identification has an effect on investors’
perceptions of disclosure credibility but does not have an effect on their willingness to
invest. Also, findings suggest that social identification and visual anonymity have a joint
effect on investors’ willingness to invest, but not on their perceptions of disclosure
credibility. Together, these findings suggest that investors’ willingness to invest and their
perceptions of disclosure credibility do not share the same antecedents and that these
constructs should be studied separately.
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APPENDIX A:
INSTRUMENTS FOR STUDY 1

185

186

187

188

189

190

[Good Pre-existing Reputation condition]

191

[Bad Pre-existing Reputation condition]

192

193

194

195

196

197
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[Deception Detected Condition]
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[Deception Not Detected Condition]
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201

202

203
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208

209

210

211

212

213

214

215

216

217

[These questions appear only if participants clicked on “Undergraduate Degree” in the
previous question]

218

219

[If participants clicked on “no” in the previous question, the first question below does not
appear]

220

[If participants clicked on “no” in the previous question, the first question below does not
appear]

221

222

APPENDIX B:
INSTRUMENTS FOR STUDY 2

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

[Incentive Condition]

231

[No Incentive Condition]

232

233

234

[Tone Manipulation Detected]

235

[Tone Manipulation Not Detected]

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

255

256

257

258

259

[These questions appear only if participants clicked on “Undergraduate Degree” in the
previous question]

260

261

[If participants clicked on “no” in the previous question, the first question below does not
appear]

262

[If participants clicked on “no” in the previous question, the first question below does not
appear]

263

264

APPENDIX C:
INSTRUMENTS FOR STUDY 3

265

266

267

268

269

270

271

272

273

274

275

276

277

[Low Social Identification Condition]

278

[High social identification]

279

[Text Comment condition: the comments below are presented in random order]

280

[Video Comments condition: the comments below are presented in random order]

281

282

283

284

285

286

287

288

289

290

291

292

293

294

295

296

297

298

299

[These questions appear only if participants clicked on “Undergraduate Degree” in the
previous question]

300

301

[If participants clicked on “no” in the previous question, the first question below does not
appear]

302

[If participants clicked on “no” in the previous question, the first question below does not
appear]

303

304
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